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AT THE START of 1992,  less than  six months  after  the fall of communism 
and  less than  one month  after  the dissolution  of the Soviet Union, Russia 
embarked  with remarkable  dispatch  on a program  of radical  economic 
reforms.  I  The economic  reforms  themselves, under  the direction  of Act- 
ing Prime  Minister  Yegor Gaidar,  combined  with the collapse of the So- 
viet state, have created  an enormous  opening  for decentralized,  market- 
based economic activity. Within  a short  period  of eight months, almost 
all centralized  operations  of the command  economy ceased; meanwhile, 
new commercial  structures  are  developing  rapidly.  Spontaneous  market 
activity is evident not only in the "kiosk  boom"  of Moscow, but also in 
growing  market-based  trade  within  Russia and between Russia and the 
rest of the world. 
The benefits of sustained economic reforms are likely to be very 
great-much  greater than is commonly supposed. The old command 
system was so inefficient  and destructive  of the quality  of economic life 
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1. For an early  discussion  of Russia's  economic  reform  program,  see Fischer  (1992). 
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that enormous scope exists for increases in average living standards 
within  a few years, particularly  as resources are shifted  out of the mili- 
tary-industrial  complex into other sectors. 
Nonetheless, Russia's financial  conditions remain horrendous  be- 
cause of the profound  disarray  left behind  by the communist  regime.  Hy- 
perinflation  is a real  risk-indeed,  the main  risk  now to democratization 
and successful transition  to a market  economy. 
Although  the tasks of stabilization  and transformation  are daunting, 
we believe that  there  is a way forward  with  a reasonable  prospect  of suc- 
cess, based on tight monetary  and fiscal policies to prevent  hyperinfla- 
tion. (We caution, however, that this way is under heavy attack from 
industrialists  seeking  large  credits  to keep alive loss-making  state enter- 
prises.) The tight  financial  policies would be accompanied  by rapid  pri- 
vatization  of enterprises  and swift opening  of international  trade  to en- 
force domestic competition,  spur  exports, and end the shortages  of key 
commodities on the home market. Similar prescriptions  are demon- 
strating  their  efficacy in much  of Eastern  Europe. In Poland,  for exam- 
ple, which also began  its reforms  with hyperinflationary  conditions,  the 
transition  to a normal,  market-based  economy is on track.  After  two and 
one-half years of reform, inflation is under control, shortages have 
ended, exports  are booming,  output  is rising,  and  the private  sector now 
accounts  for more  than  half  of total employment. 
In Russia, reforms  are  clouded  in confusion.  Data  are  incomplete  and 
misleading,  and easily misinterpreted  to give an overly bleak account. 
Many criticisms  within  Russia, which are repeated  at face value in the 
West, are politically motivated rather than analytically sound. The 
many adverse trends in the Russian economy are attributed  to the re- 
forms  themselves, rather  than  to the legacy of the old regime.  This mis- 
taken attribution  results in an overstatement  of the "costs" of the re- 
forms, and therefore an undue pessimism about the reform policies 
themselves. This has resulted in strong pressures to abandon  the re- 
forms,  even before  they have begun  to take  hold. The timetable  forjudg- 
ing the reforms  is also frequently  out of kilter,  sometimes  wildly so. For 
instance, the speaker  of the Russian  parliament,  Ruslan Khasbulatov, 
called  for the demission  of the government  ten days after  the start  of re- 
forms.2  Former  President  Gorbachev  demurred,  saying  that  the govern- 
2. See "Russian  Parliamentary  Speaker  Attacks  Yeltsin  Government,"Reuter  Library 
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ment deserved ten more days!' While we believe that the government 
and the West have been far too slow to face up to certain  urgent  tasks, 
thereby  adding  to the risks  of hyperinflation,  we must  also stress that  the 
reform  process is a mere  eight months  old. 
The real question for Russia, in our opinion, is not primarily  one of 
economic strategy,  but rather  one of political  management  of economic 
reform  in the next few years. Will Russia's political  and administrative 
institutions  prove sufficient  to head off damaging  hyperinflation?  Will 
rear-guard  actions by old power structures in the military-industrial 
complex succeed in derailing  key reforms?  Will  the nascent democratic 
institutions  survive  the challenge  of social turmoil  in the face of dramatic 
economic change?  We believe that  the answers  to all of these questions 
can be favorable,  but success will require  intensive  effort  and  skilled  po- 
litical  management. 
We discuss these issues as follows. First, we outline the basic eco- 
nomic situation inherited  by the Yeltsin-Gaidar  government and the 
strategy  of economic reform  that was chosen. We emphasize  the twin 
nature  of the task:  urgent  monetary  stabilization  and  long-term  creation 
of a market  economy. The monetary  task  has been particularly  complex, 
given the breakdown  of the old Soviet monetary  and financial  system 
and the bizarre  and destabilizing  nature  of the monetary  arrangements 
that emerged at the start of 1992. Monetary  policy has not been con- 
ducted with sound  judgment  or with vigor; financial  disarray  remains, 
and the flood of credits since July 1992  leaves Russia facing the risk of 
imminent  hyperinflation. 
Second, we discuss the social and political  context of the reforms  to 
try to judge whether they will be sustainable. Of course, the overall 
process is at a very early stage and the data  are sketchy and  inaccurate. 
Therefore,  we draw  on lessons not only from  Russia itself, but from  re- 
forms in other countries, including  recent experience in Eastern Eu- 
the government,  which is not only a failure  but simply incompetent,"  Interfax  quoted 
Khasbulatov  as saying  after  meeting  a delegation  of Italian  parliamentarians.  "Such  a situ- 
ation  is developing  that  we [parliament]  can either  suggest  to the President  he remove  the 
incapable  government,  or do it ourselves." 
3. See Christopher  Boian,  "Gorbachev,  Back  in  Public  Arena,  Says  Further  Economic 
Reforms  Needed,"  Agence France  Presse, January  14, 1992,  dateline  Moscow. "Gorba- 
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rope. In our view, the social basis for the reforms  exists. The real test 
will be in the area of political reform and in the extent of Western 
support. 
The Economic Inheritance 
The general  outlines of the Stalinist  economic legacy are now rather 
well known. We describe  first  the main  structural  dimensions,  and then 
the macroeconomic  inheritance.  The key structural  characteristics  are: 
a concentration  of resources in heavy industry,  particularly  in the mili- 
tary-industrial  complex, to the neglect of consumer industry  and ser- 
vices; state or collective ownership of almost all productive assets; 
bureaucratic  control over prices, domestic resource flows, and inter- 
national  trade;  and the absence of a legal framework  to protect  private 
property  and  to support  market  activity. Some data  and  a few comments 
are in order  on the first  two points. 
The Structural Legacy 
Table 1 shows the allocation  of output  and  labor  across major  sectors 
of the economies of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the United 
States. We see clearly  the remarkable  concentration  of resources in in- 
dustry  and the neglect of the service sector in the FSU. Within  Russian 
industry, resources are heavily concentrated in machine building, 
which  includes  much  of the armaments  sector  and  other  parts  of the mili- 
tary-industrial  complex (MIC). The MIC was built up by an extensive 
system of implicit  and explicit subsidies, which pushed resources into 
the sector at the expense of other parts of the economy. In particular, 
the MIC  was guaranteed  cheap access to energy and other raw materi- 
als, access to rationed  foreign  exchange,  and  heavy budgetary  resources 
for investment  projects. 
The exact size of the MIC under the old regime was not precisely 
known, although  one recent estimate  puts it at around  20 percent  of in- 
dustrial  employment,  16  percent  of industrial  production,  and 12  percent 
of industrial  capital  of the USSR. In all, MIC  employment  is estimated 
at 7.5 million  personnel, or about 5 percent of the Soviet work force.4 
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Table  1. The Structure  of Output  and Employment  in the United  States 
and the Soviet  Union 
Percent  of total 
Output  a  Employment 
United  Soviet  United  Soviet 
Sector  States  Union  States  Union 
Industry  23.5  48.9  17.6  28.9 
Electricity  3.3  2.2  0.8  0.6 
Fuel  2.3  5.0  0.7  1.2 
Metallurgy  1.1  3.7  2.1  1.5 
Chemical  2.2  3.1  1.7  1.4 
Machine  bldg. and metal working  8.7  15.1  6.3  13.0 
Wood and paper  1.7  2.1  1.7  2.1 
Construction  materials  0.6  2.1  0.5  1.9 
Light industry  1.0  6.1  1.8  3.7 
Food  2.4  8.1  1.5  2.4 
Other  industry  0.3  1.4  0.3  1.3 
Construction  6.1  10.7  4.6  11.5 
Agriculture  1.9  9.3  2.7  19.3 
Transportation  and communicationb  5.8  10.1  4.0  7.2 
Trade  and distribution  11.2  6.1  22.2  8.0 
Other  1.5  0.8  1.4  0.6 
Services  50.0  13.9  47.6  24.5 
Source: Kwon  (1992a,  p. 56). Data  for the United  States  are for 1986.  Data  for the Soviet Union  are for 1988. 
a. Output  is measured  as value  added  in domestic  currency. 
b. Includes  passenger  services  as well as goods services. 
These estimates must be judged with care. They count the output and 
employment  of enterprises  under  the direct control of the USSR Mili- 
tary-Industrial  Commission, known by its Russian acronym as VPK. 
The VPK supervised the work of eight ministries.5  The enterprises 
under  VPK supervision  in fact produced  for both military  and civilian 
purposes.6  At the same time, enterprises  outside of direct  control  of the 
5. The ministries  were: the Ministry  of Atomic Power and Industry  (responsible  for 
the development and production  of atomic weapons); the Ministry of General Ma- 
chinebuilding  (responsible  for  the  development  of space  technology  and  ballistic  missiles); 
the Ministry  of Defense Industry  (responsible  for missile technology  and conventional 
forces equipment);  the Ministry  of Aviation  Industry;  the Ministry  of Shipbuilding;  the 
Ministry  of Radio  Industry  (responsible  for  mainframe  computers  and  radar);  the Ministry 
of Electronics  Industry  (responsible  for  electronic  components);  and  the  Ministry  of Com- 
munications  (responsible  for communications  equipment  and telephone  and postal ser- 
vices). For  details,  see Cooper  (1991,  pp. 6-11). 
6.  One  estimate,  mentioned  by Cooper  (1991,  p. 14),  holds  that  20 percent  of the  enter- 
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Table  2. Indicators  of Raw Materials  Production  and Energy  Consumption,  1988 
Soviet  United  West 
Commodity  Union  States  Germany  Japan 
Millions  of metric  tons, except energya 
Crude  steel  163.00  90.60  41.00  105.70 
Refined  copper  1.00  1.86  0.43  0.96 
Primary  aluminum  2.50  3.94  0.74  0.04 
Synthetic  rubber  2.44  2.34  0.49  1.30 
Primary  energy  27.28  38.93  5.53  8.07 
Thousands  of metric  tons per U.S. billion  dollars of 
GDP, except energyb 
Crude  steel  280.00  18.49  34.35  36.47 
Refined  copper  1.71  0.38  0.36  0.33 
Primary  aluminum  4.28  0.80  0.62  0.01 
Synthetic  rubber  4.18  0.48  0.41  0.45 
Primary  energy  46.78  7.94  4.63  2.78 
Source: CIA (1990),  International  Financial  Statistics  (IMF,  September  1992),  and  the Economist  (1990). 
a. Commodities  are measured  as millions  of metric  tons of production.  Primary  energy  is measured  as millions  of 
barrels  per day, oil equivalent,  of consumption. 
b. Commodities  are  measured  as thousands  of metric  tons of production  per U.S. billion  dollars  of GNP. Primary 
energy  is measured  as thousands  of barrels  per day, oil equivalent,  of consumption  per U.S. billion  dollars  of GDP. 
GDP  figures  are  in 1988  current  dollars.  U.S. billion  dollars  of GDP  figure  for the Soviet  Union  is from  the Economist 
(1990). 
MIC  complex  provide  inputs  into military  production,  but  are not coun- 
ted in the MIC.7  The estimate is also made somewhat arbitrary  by the 
huge price distortions,  secrecy, and the virtual  lack of public informa- 
tion concerning  the employment  and  production  in the nuclear  weapons 
sector. 
Naturally,  the MIC fares rather  badly overall in the face of market 
reforms. As soon as the sector is opened to market pressures, it is 
squeezed between falling  demand,  resulting  from sharp  budgetary  cut- 
backs on armaments  spending,  and a supply squeeze, resulting  from a 
loss of privileged  access to scarce  resources. Of course, the reduction  of 
military  production  in favor of civilian production  is a key goal of the 
economic reform,  but also the source of intense political  attack on the 
government.  As we shall recount later, the pressures  from the MIC to 
slow or reverse  the economic  reforms  have been a central  feature  of So- 
viet, and then Russian,  political  life since 1987. 
An illustration  of the structural  maladjustment  caused by the relent- 
less pursuit  of heavy industry  is seen vividly in table  2, which compares 
industrial  production  in the Soviet Union and several industrial  econo- 
7. These include  enterprises  of the civilian  machinebuilding  complex  (such as trucks 
and  diesel engines)  and  enterprises  of the Ministry  of Metallurgy. David  Lipton and Jeffrey D.  Sachs  219 
Table  3. Indicators  of Retail  Trade  Services  in Various  Countries,  1985 
Per 10,000  of population 
Employment 
Country  Stores  in retail trade 
Soviet Union  20  177 
United States  61  491 
United Kingdom  61  412 
Germany  66  383 
France  86  335 
Japan  135  527 
Italy  175  350 
Source:  Joint  Study  (1991,  vol. 3, table  V.2.7, p. 53). 
mies in 1988.  Despite the fact that the other countries  each have an ag- 
gregate  GNP much  higher  than that of the FSU, it was the largest  steel 
producer  in the world,  with  a steel output  per dollar  of GDP  fifteen  times 
higher  than  that of the United States in 1988!  The flip side has been the 
squeeze of the service sector, which can be seen by the paucity  of retail 
establishments  in the FSU. Table 3 compares  the retail  trade sector in 
the Soviet Union and several major  industrialized  nations, as of 1985. 
The  number  of shops  per 10,000  population  in the Soviet Union  was one- 
third  of the level in the United States and  less than  one-sixth  of the level 
in Japan. 
The second main  structural  feature  we want  to emphasize  is the over- 
whelming  extent of state ownership.  Until the mid-1980s,  more than  95 
percent of production  was in state hands; this has since dropped to 
around  85 percent  with the spread  of other  forms  of ownership,  notably 
private  ownership,  cooperatives, and  joint ventures. Nonetheless, the 
Russian  state remains  the nominal  owner of about 23,000  industrial  en- 
terprises, and perhaps  as many as 221,000  enterprises  in total.8  As we 
have described  earlier  for the case of Poland,  the vast state holdings  re- 
quire  a systemic conception  of privatization  that  moves beyond  the sale 
of enterprises  on a one-by-one basis that constitutes the privatization 
process in most parts  of the world.9  The government  has wisely adopted 
a strategy  for mass privatization  that  will cover around  three-fourths  of 
the industrial  capital  stock in 1993.10 
8. Kwon  (1992b,  pp. 2, 13). 
9.  Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990b). 
10. For an overview of the Russian  government's  privatization  program,  see State 
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The Macroeconomic  Legacy 
The communist  regime  left behind  financial  chaos of a sort  even more 
virulent  than seen in Poland,  Bulgaria,  and Yugoslavia,  where hyperin- 
flation  also erupted  in the final stages of the communist  collapse. The 
Russian  government  inherited  a disastrous  legacy including:  a 1991  bud- 
get deficit estimated to be 20 percent of GNP, financed  almost exclu- 
sively by money issue;11  a monetary  overhang,  in which  M2  as a percent 
of GNP had  risen  to around  65 percent;  more  than  $65  billion  in external 
debt, accumulated  in a few years, and a complete depletion  of foreign 
exchange  reserves;12 a labor  force in which  nominal  wage payments  had 
outstripped  official  price increases  by a very wide margin  in the preced- 
ing three years; and a currency  shared  among  fifteen new states, each 
with  a new (and  inexperienced)  central  bank  issuing  the shared  currency 
without coordination  with any of the other states. Table 4 summarizes 
some basic macroeconomic  indicators  for Russia. 
We turn  first  to wages. In the Soviet Union,  just as in the case of Po- 
land and its communist  reformers,  the Gorbachev-inspired  enterprise 
reforms in 1987 gave increased autonomy to the state-owned enter- 
prises. Understandably,  using  their  new-found  flexibility,  managers  and 
workers  granted  themselves large  wage increases, at the expense of tax 
payments  to the state budget.  The wage pressures  were aided  and abet- 
ted by the "soft-budget  constraint"  correctly  stressed  by Janos  Kornai.  13 
Even beyond cutting  back on transfers  to the budget,  enterprises  could 
depend on generous subsidies and cheap credits to cover higher  wage 
costs. 
The contrast in wage developments in Russia and Poland is high- 
lighted  in figure  1. Soviet average  industrial  real  wages increased  79 per- 
cent between 1985  and  December 1991;  by contrast,  Polish  average  real 
wages for six key sectors increased  by 53 percent  between 1985  and  De- 
cember  1989.  Because the supply  of consumer  goods grew  little, if at all, 
and certainly  not commensurately  with the increase  in ruble  wages, ex- 
cess demand  developed.  In a market  system, price  increases  would  have 
1  1. IMF  (1992a,  table 18,  p. 70). 
12. Government  of Russia. 
13. See Kornai  (1992)  and  many  of Kornai's  earlier  works. David  Lipton and Jeffrey D.  Sachs  221 
Table  4. Russia's  Macroeconomic  Performance 
Indicator  and units  1990  1991  1992a 
Percent  per year 
Real GDP  0.4  -9.0  ... 
Real industrial  output  -0.1  - 8.0  -  13.5 
Consumer  price index  6.8  96.3  ... 
(Within  period)  . .  .  160.6  900.0 
Average  real wage  8.5  -9.5  -  33.0b 
Industrial  real wage  6.9  - 5.6  -  28.0b 
Ruble M2 (end of period) 
Nominal  15.3  111.1  198.0c 
Real  ...  -19.0  - 73.Oc 
Percent of GDP 
Ruble M2 (end of period)d  67.7  59.8  14.8c 
Budget  deficit  ...  19.9  4.4 
Portion  financed 
domestically  ...  19.9  2.0 
Billions of U.S. dollars 
Trade  balance  - 2.0  6.5  -  1.3 
Exports  80.9  51.6  14.9 
Oil  27.1  11.8  3.8 
Natural  gas  9.6  10.3  3.4 
Other  44.2  29.5  7.8 
Imports  82.9  45.1  16.2 
Debt service due  14.0  10.4  9.2e 
Principal  11.1  7.8  5.6e 
Interest  2.9  2.6  3.6e 
Source:  Government  of Russia,  and IMF (1992a, table  18, p. 70, and table 24, p. 77). 
a.  Based  on first six months of  1992, except  where noted. 
b.  Data for August  1992 in comparison  with the average of  1991. 
c.  Data for end of July  1992. 
d.  Percent of GDP based on annualized estimates  of monthly GDP for the final month in each time period. Percent 
changes for 1992 represent July 1992 in comparison  with December  1991. 
e.  Projected for all of  1992. 
dissipated  the wage increases. In a system of generalized  price  controls, 
the result  was intensifying  shortages  and lengthening  queues in the offi- 
cial markets  and inflation  in the black  markets.  The statistical  real wage 
was thereby disconnected  from actual  living standards.  If anything,  an 
inverse  relationship occurred: higher real wages resulted in longer 
queues, and  thereby  a loss of work and  leisure  time.  14 
14. In our 1990  paper  (Lipton  and  Sachs, 1990a),  we pointed  out the theoretical  possi- 
bility  of such  an inverse  relationship.  See also Roberts  (1992). 222  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Figure  1. Real Wage  Developments  in Russia  and Poland,  1985-92 
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Sources:  Government  of  Russia  and  Biuletyn  Statystyczny  (Monthly  Statistical  Bulletin),  various  issues.  For 
Russia,  the industrial real wage is shown.  For Poland, the real wage for the six key sectors  of the economy  is shown. 
Wage data are annual averages,  except  for the year before the economic  reform programs were introduced.  For that 
year, the December  real wage is shown by the dashed  line to capture the peak.  For Russia,  the peak real wage  was 
in December  1991. For Poland,  the peak real wage was  in December  1989. The last data point is the real wage for 
August  1992. 
The wage increases  preceding  radical  economic reforms  left the Pol- 
ish and Russian reformers  with the politically painful task of freeing 
prices  to end the shortages  and  to return  the real  wage to historical  levels 
justified by productivity.  Needless to say, in each country, critics ac- 
cused the reforms  of causing  a sharp  decline in living standards.  In Po- 
land, it became an article  of faith  that  the price liberalization  had driven 
down  "real  living  standards"  by 30 percent  at the start  of 1990.  In Russia, 
it is typically  asserted  that  the fall has been around  50 percent.  But as we 
can see from figure 1, and as we shall stress again later, the charge is 
misleading.  Price liberalization  basically restored  wage-price  relations 
that  had prevailed  before the 1987  communist-led  changes  in enterprise 
autonomy,  without  representing  an actual  fall in living standards.  '5 
15. We expressed  worries  about  the likely political  fallout  of Russian  price  liberaliza- 
tion in a January  1991  article  in The Financial  Times: "The  Polish  wage explosion  during 
1988-89  is being  replayed  in the Soviet Union  ...  The  result  is that  as in Poland  until  1989, 
the measured  real  wage has skyrocketed  since perestroika  began,  in fact rising  by no less David Lipton and Jeffrey D.  Sachs  223 
Table  5. Russia's  Balance  of Payments,  1990-92a 
Billions  of U.S. dollars 
1990  1991  1992b 
Current  account  -4.5  4.1  -7.7 
Trade  balance  -2.0  6.5  -2.7 
Exports  80.9  51.6  34.4 
Oil  27.1  11.8  9.9 
Natural  gas  9.6  10.3  7.4 
Other  44.2  29.5  17.1 
Imports  -82.9  -45.1  -37.1 
Service account  -4.1  -4.6  -5.9 
Interest  due  -2.9  -2.7  - 3.7 
Gold sales  1.6  2.2  0.9 
Capital  account  1.4  2.7  3.3 
Grants  0.0  1.6  2.7 
Long-term  capital  (net)  2.0  3.8  5.6 
Other  -0.6  -2.7  -5.0 
Overall  balance  - 3.1  6.8  -4.4 
Financing  3.1  -6.8  4.4 
Net international  reserves  9.2  0.6  -0.7 
Gross reserves (-  increase)  5.1  1.5  -1.4 
IMF credits  0.0  0.0  1.0 
Short-term  liabilities  4.1  -0.9  -0.3 
Arrears  2.7  -0.1  -2.9 
Debt deferral  0.0  0.2  7.9 
Otherc  - 8.8  -7.5  0.1 
Sources: International  Monetary  Fund  (1992a)  for 1990  only, and  government  of Russia. 
a. Excludes  inter-republican  trade. 
b. Figures  for 1992  are estimates. 
c.  For 1990  and 1991,  primarily  reflects  the financing  of Russia's  trade  surpluses  with  other  republics. 
THE  BALANCE  OF PAYMENTS  CRISIS.  Anotherpartofthemacroeco- 
nomic legacy is the balance  of payments  crisis. Table 5 indicates  the se- 
verity of this problem.  This crisis has three roots. First, oil and gas ex- 
ports, the largest foreign exchange earners, have been on a steep 
downward  trend  in recent years. Total oil production  in Russia has de- 
than  25 percent  between 1985  and 1990.  No commentator  would  venture  to say that real 
incomes have risen  in the Soviet Union. Nor should  they claim  that real  incomes would 
actually  fall if the same  real  wage  increase  were to be eliminated  by a future  liberalization 
of prices. If prices  are liberalized  in the Soviet Union, we would  not be surprised  to hear 
a chorus  of voices bemoaning  the sharp  drop  in real  incomes, repeating  the incessant  and 
incorrect  assessment  of price  liberalization  in Poland."  (Jeffrey  Sachs and  David  Lipton, 
" 'Shock  Therapy'  and  Real  Incomes:  Eastern  European  Reforms,"  The  Financial  Times, 
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clined from 560 million metric tons (mmt)  in 1989  to 516 mmt in 1990, 
and  from  461 mmt  in 1991  to a projected  395 mmt  in 1992.16  Dollar  earn- 
ings on oil and gas exports from Russia to countries  outside the Com- 
monwealth  of Independent  States (CIS)  will have declined  from  around 
$37 billion in 1990  to a projected $17 billion in 1992.'7 The downward 
trend  results from the depletion of Russian oil fields, inadequate  tech- 
niques for secondary  recovery from oil and gas fields, and large losses 
in pipeline  transport,  where  leakages  can result  in losses of 10  percent  of 
shipments.  This downward  trend  is projected  to continue  unless it can 
be halted  by several  billion  dollars  of new capital  investment. 
Second, the Gorbachev regime exhausted Russia's international 
creditworthiness  by the rapid  accumulation  of around  $65  billion  of for- 
eign indebtedness,  mostly in a six-year  period.  The regime  also virtually 
depleted Russia's foreign exchange reserves, including  the stocks of 
monetary  gold. Access to credits from commercial  sources dried up in 
1990  to 1991,  when the Russian  foreign  exchange  bank, Vnesheconom- 
bank, started  to fall significantly  into arrears  on trade credits. Official 
credits  also were effectively cut off by mid-  1991.  The result  was a nega- 
tive net resource transfer,  leading  to a collapse of foreign  exchange re- 
serves and a rise in arrears  on debt repayments.'8  During 1990-91, the 
Soviet Union spent $9.7 billion  of international  reserves, including  gold, 
in debt service. When  the Gaidar  government  began  its economic  reform 
program,  Russia's  gold stock had  fallen  to about  $2.6 billion  and  the for- 
eign exchange  reserves of the Central  Bank  of Russia (CBR)  were only 
a few hundred  million  dollars, or enough to cover only a few hours of 
imports !19 
16. Government  of Russia. 
17. IMF  (1992a,  table  24, p. 77) and  goverment  of Russia. 
18. Some analysts  have argued  against  Western  assistance  to Russia,  supporting  their 
point  with the observation  that  $40 billion  to $50  billion  in loans during  1991  was wasted. 
(See, for example,  Henry  Kissinger,  "The  Question  of Aid," Washington  Post, March  31, 
1992,  p. A17.) Data  from  the European  Community  show  that  Western  loan  commitments 
to the FSU may  have  totaled  about  $57  billion  in 1990  and 1991.  Disbursements  in the two- 
year  period,  however,  were  about  $26  billion.  Moreover,  there  is little  mystery  about  what 
became  of the funds.  Debt service  payments  were  on the order  of $40  billion  (including  the 
repayment  of short-term  debts). The net flow of minus  $14  billion  was paid  for mainly  by 
a run-down  of reserves of $9 billion, a small  trade  surplus,  and an increase  in arrears  of 
roughly  $3.5 billion  (Government  of Russia). 
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Just  at the time of the appointment  of the Yeltsin-Gaidar  government 
in late October  1991,  following  the failed  putsch, the Group  of Seven in- 
dustrialized  democracies  (the  G-7)  pressured  Russia  into signing  a Mem- 
orandum  of Understanding  (MOU)  regarding  Soviet debt, in which  Rus- 
sia and  the other signatories  accepted "joint  and several  responsibility" 
for the debt and agreed  to pay interest  due. In fact, and totally predict- 
ably, Russia  has not been able to fulfill  the obligation:  arrears  to the offi- 
cial creditors  (of the Paris  Club)  and  to private  creditors  (the  commercial 
banks and suppliers)  have mounted  rapidly  in 1992. The MOU was a 
(typical)  empty gesture of G-7 debt management  that has muddied  the 
waters, rather  than  resolving  problems. 
The third  part of the balance of payments crisis has been the steep 
collapse of trade  among  the countries  of the former  Council  for Mutual 
Economic  Assistance (CMEA).  In part,  the collapse  has resulted  from  a 
decline in Russian sales of oil and gas to Eastern Europe. In part, ex- 
ports of military  equipment  to the region  have declined.  An estimate  by 
Herbert Wulf suggests that USSR military  exports in constant 1990 
prices fell from  about  $15  billion  in 1989  to less than  $5 billion  in 1991.20 
A third  problem  is the failure  to establish a working  payments mecha- 
nism  for trade  with Eastern  Europe  in 1991.  Overall,  Russia's  exports  to 
the CMEA  countries  declined  steeply, from  an estimated  $40.1  billion  in 
1990  to $15.9 billion  in 1991.21 
The overall balance  of payments  crisis has produced  a dramatic  col- 
lapse of Russian  imports,  as seen in table  5. As the Soviet Union disinte- 
grated,  Russia's imports  fell from  $82.9 billion  in 1990  to only $45.1 bil- 
lion in 1991, an astounding  drop of 46 percent.22  The collapse has not 
been arrested  in 1992.  Despite IMF  projections  in April  that  exports  and 
imports  would  stabilize  in 1992,  the balance  of payments  crisis  has inten- 
sified.  Mainly  because  of difficulties  in the production  of energy,  exports 
continue  to decline, and as a result, imports  in the first  half of the year 
were $36 billion  at an annual  rate (a further  20 percent  decline from the 
low import  level of 1991).23 
20. Wulf  (1992,  figure  4, p. 6). Wulf's  estimate  does not break  down  how much  of this 
decline  was caused by a drop  of exports  to Eastern  Europe,  versus the Middle  East and 
other areas. 
21. IMF  (1992a,  table  23, p. 76). 
22. IMF  (1992a,  table  24, p. 77)  and  government  of Russia. 
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The fall of exports and the withdrawal  of financial  credits has led to 
an intense scarcity of foreign  exchange in Russia, now reflected  in the 
collapse of the real purchasing  power of the ruble vis-a-vis foreign ex- 
change.  Consider,  for example, an average  worker's  ability  to purchase 
dollars  (or dollar-priced  items) using ruble  wage earnings.  The average 
worker  earned about 5,900 rubles per month in August 1992. Because 
dollars are so scarce and therefore so expensive, this wage translated 
into only about  $30  per month  at the floating  exchange  rate  of 205  rubles 
per dollar  that  prevailed  at the end of August. 
The cutback  of imports  is one important  cause of the ongoing  collapse 
of industrial  production.  (The  other  main  cause is the necessary and  de- 
sirable  cutback  in the output  of the military-industrial  complex.)  In 1991, 
industries  were subjected  to sharp  cutbacks  in centralized  allocations  of 
imported  inputs,  including  raw  materials,  intermediate  goods, and  spare 
parts; this contributed  to the 9 percent fall in GDP, compared with 
1990.24 In 1992,  the intense shortage  of foreign  exchange  is hitting  enter- 
prises through  market  mechanisms,  rather  than through  central  alloca- 
tions of foreign  exchange. Specifically,  enterprises  cannot  afford  to pur- 
chase imported  inputs at the free market  exchange rate because they 
cannot  pass the high costs of imported  inputs  on to their  domestic con- 
sumers,  in view of average  wages of about  $30  per month.  Similarly,  en- 
terprises cannot afford to purchase domestically produced tradable 
goods, such as metal  ores, because the prices of such goods are now be- 
ing drawn  up toward  world market  prices in the same way as imported 
goods. 
M  O  N E T A R  Y D I S A R  R  A Y.  Another  part  of the macroeconomic  legacy 
was a monetary  system in disarray.  Most  importantly,  during  1991,  each 
republic  in the former  Soviet Union established  its own central bank, 
which  began  issuing  ruble  bank  credits  alongside  the credits  of Gosbank, 
the central  bank  of the Soviet Union. Ruble  credits  issued  by one central 
bank  were accepted  as a means  of payment  throughout  the country.  This 
distressing  situation  promoted  extremely  rapid  money growth  in which 
republican  governments  and  enterprises  could look to their  new central 
banks  as a fairly  automatic  source of credit. 
The situation  was exacerbated  by three  conditions.  First, throughout 
1991,  republics  struggled  with  the Soviet central  government  over politi- 
24. IMF  (1992a,  table  4, p. 56). David  Lipton and Jeffrey D.  Sachs  227 
cal legitimacy  and control of resources. Therefore,  republican  central 
banks and parliaments  bid for the loyalty of enterprises,  particularly  in 
the military-industrial  complex, through  the ready  granting  of credits  at 
very low nominal  interest  rates and highly negative real interest rates. 
Second, during 1990  and 1991, banks established  by state enterprises 
greatly  proliferated  and  were licensed by republican  authorities  with no 
regard  to capital  adequacy,  conflict  of interest, or other  prudential  con- 
cerns. The republican  central banks (particularly  in Russia) fed these 
new banks  by granting  them refinance  credits  for on-lending,  largely  to 
the enterprises  that  owned them.  The number  of banks  operating  in Rus- 
sia went from one monobank-Gosbank-in  1988, to more than 1,500 
commercial  banks  with more  than  2,000  branches  by the end of 1991.  25 
Third,  there was little technical  understanding  and no tradition  of an 
active monetary  policy to limit  credit  growth.  Throughout  the period  of 
central  planning,  credit  flows were subordinated  to physical  commodity 
flows as assigned  in the plan. In other  words, enterprises  were automati- 
cally given the monetary  resources  to pay for inputs  assigned  to them  in 
the plan. The idea that  bank  credit  should  be limited  to restrict  the over- 
all growth  of the money supply  simply  did not exist until 1992. 
The fiscal and monetary  crisis, the wage explosion, and the collapse 
of the ruble all contributed  to an enormous excess demand  for goods 
during  1991.  As shown in table  4, the money supply  (M2)  as a percent  of 
GDP was in the range  of 60 to 70 in 1991.  This condition,  together  with 
the large  budget  deficit  and  the high  wage levels, stoked total  demand  in 
the economy. This excess demand  resulted  in intensifying  shortages,  a 
collapse of the official  trading  system, black market  prices many times 
official prices, and a descent into primitive barter relations in the 
economy. 
The excess demand  was temporarily  reduced  in early 1991  by admin- 
istrative  price increases (as opposed to price liberalization),  and by a 
partial  monetary  confiscation,  undertaken  by the last Communist  prime 
minister,  Valentin  Pavlov. The monetary  confiscation  removed  R4 bil- 
lion, representing  about  3 percent  of the ruble  money supply;26  then, as 
is typical  of weak communist  governments,  Pavlov agreed  to give back 
the money  in various  forms  of compensation.  After  breaching  one of the 
25. IMF  (1992b,  p. 15). 
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most fundamental  contracts  with the public  through  the confiscation  of 
currency, the Pavlov measure was largely ineffective. At nearly the 
same  time, many  consumer  prices were raised  by a factor  of three. This 
succeeded  briefly  in restoring  foodstuffs  to the official  retail  outlets. The 
ongoing  increase  in credits  and  wages, however, quickly  led to renewed 
shortages,  which were exacerbated  by hoarding  in anticipation  of fur- 
ther  official  prices increases. By the end of 1991,  the official  supply  sys- 
tem had completely  collapsed. The overall situation  resembled  that de- 
scribed  by Keynes: 
If a man is compelled  to exchange the fruits of his labors  for paper  which, as 
experience  soon teaches him, he cannot use to purchase  what he requires  at a 
price comparable  to that which he has received for his own products, he will 
keep  his produce  for  himself,  dispose  of it to his friends  and  neighbors  as a favor, 
or relax  his efforts  in producing  it. A system of compelling  the exchange  of com- 
modities  at what  is not their  real  relative  value not only relaxes  production,  but 
leads finally  to waste and  inefficiency  of barter.27 
State and municipal grain reserves were rapidly depleted, as food- 
producing  regions hoarded  food or bartered  it directly  with enterprises 
producing  consumer  goods, rather  than selling  it to the official  procure- 
ment agencies at unrealistic  official prices. Some regions actually ex- 
ported grain  to neighboring  countries  (such as Iran)  to earn the vastly 
higher  black market  prices, at the same time that emergency  food ship- 
ments to the Soviet Union were starting.  Fear of hunger  in the winter 
of 1991-92  became widespread.  Of course, the descent into barter  was 
widely misinterpreted  in Russia and the West as a production  break- 
down, rather  than a monetary  breakdown.  Western  aid agencies spoke 
of sending  missions to help the Russians  with improved  distribution  of 
food, better  bakeries,  and  better  storage  facilities, rather  than  with  price 
liberalization  and  monetary  control. 
The new Gaidar  economic  team  directed  its attention  to the monetary 
character  of the shortages  by putting  the emphasis  on price  liberalization 
and monetary  restriction. Interestingly,  key advisors harkened  to the 
grain  shortages  that afflicted  the provisional  government  of Alexander 
Kerensky  between February  1917  and the October  Revolution.28  Then 
too, the combination  of price controls and inflationary  finance  had re- 
sulted in a breakdown  of the availability  of bread  in the official supply 
27. Keynes (1920,  p. 240). 
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networks and extensive hoarding  in the countryside. Kerensky made 
the disastrous decision to address the problem by attempting,  fruit- 
lessly, to arrange  barter  deals between agricultural  regions and urban 
enterprises.  Labor  unrest  in the face of food shortages  and agricultural 
discontent  in the face of low fixed  prices for grain  contributed  to the on- 
set of the Bolshevik  Revolution. 
The Reforms in the Short Run 
The economic reform  program  introduced  in January  1992  has five 
main  pillars.  The first  and most immediate  aim is to end Russia's finan- 
cial chaos and make the ruble a usable and well-functioning  money for 
both commerce  and  finance.  Gaidar  reckoned  correctly  that  without  the 
rehabilitation  of the ruble,  Russia  would  not be able to stabilize  the mac- 
roeconomy, proceed with the creation  of a market  economy, or begin 
the painstaking  structural  adjustments  that would be required  in the 
coming  years. 
The second task is market  liberalization,  including  the sharp  cutback 
of state orders, the opening  of the economy to trade, and the construc- 
tion of a legal system for private property  and market-based  activity. 
The third  task is rapid  privatization.  The fourth  task is the construction 
of a social safety net including,  most urgently, a system of unemploy- 
ment  compensation.  The fifth  task is the design  of an appropriate  indus- 
trial policy to reduce the scale of the military-industrial  complex and 
ease the transition  to civilian  uses of the vast resources  in that sector. 
The first  two tasks, stabilization  and liberalization,  are the principal 
focus of the reforms  to date and are the focus of our discussion as well. 
Dramatic  progress is already underway, however, on the longer-term 
aspects of the reform,  mainly  privatization  and  social policy-areas  that 
we stress are crucial  to the success of the reforms,  but that are beyond 
the scope of this paper,  except for the following  brief  overview. 
The Gaidar  economic team has moved swiftly to prepare  for priva- 
tization, recognizing  how delays in privatization  in Poland and else- 
where have undermined  stabilization  efforts and forestalled structural 
adjustment.  Privatization  of small-scale  enterprises  began  at the start  of 
the year, and  privatization  of most large-scale  enterprises  was slated to 
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prises covering  nearly  three-quarters  of state industrial  capital  (by book 
value) are to have corporatized-to have converted  to joint stock com- 
pany  form-by  October  1, 1992.  Under  mass  privatization,  the shares  of 
these companies  will be privatized  in several blocks. Some shares will 
be distributed  either for free or at deeply discounted  prices to workers 
and managers;  some shares will be auctioned to the public through 
vouchers;  and some shares  will be sold in cash auctions. 
The share  distribution  techniques  are  intended  to improve  the system 
of corporate  governance,  as several groups  of owners come to exercise 
influence over company management. Workers will acquire shares; 
however, it is unlikely  that  worker  ownership  will lead to excessive con- 
trol  by insiders  because workers'  shares  will be held  individually  (rather 
than collectively)  and  will  be  freely  transferable. The  privatiza- 
tion vouchers, distributed  to the public on October 1, 1992,  can be ex- 
changed  directly  for shares,  but  it is expected that  many  of the vouchers 
will be placed in newly formed investment  funds. These funds should 
attract  voucher-holders  because they will offer a diversified  portfolio; 
managers  of the investment  funds, in turn, should then be in a position 
to actively monitor  the companies  in their  portfolios. 
As for social  policy, the key work  of setting  up an  unemployment  ben- 
efits system has been undertaken  during  the year, but unemployment  it- 
self remains  well below 1 percent of the labor  force.29  As for industrial 
policy, as of September  1992,  the government  had  only begun  to outline 
its strategy  for  priority  sectors (agriculture,  energy,  and  military  conver- 
sion), in a program  of targeted  assistance (linked  to foreign  financial  as- 
sistance from the World  Bank, the European  Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development  (EBRD), and other sources) that  will begin  in 1993. 
The first  step toward  rehabilitating  the ruble  was to eliminate  the huge 
monetary  overhang.  Gaidar  decided to attack the problem  through  the 
liberalization  of prices  and  economic activity, combined  with  restrictive 
monetary  and fiscal policy. With this approach, market  forces rather 
29. Brainerd  (1992b).  The Federal  Employment  Service (FES) of Russia is charged 
with developing  an employment  policy and managing  the unemployment  compensation 
system.  As of July  1992,  250,000  workers,  or  0.3 percent  of the  labor  force, were  registered 
as unemployed.  Unemployment  compensation  is available  for a registered  unemployed 
person  who has  worked  for at least twelve weeks before  unemployment.  Benefits  may  last 
up  to one year.  During  the first  three  months,  the  benefit  is 75  percent  of the previous  wage; 
during  the next four months,  the ratio  is 60 percent  of the previous  wage;  thereafter,  the 
ratio  is 45 percent  of the previous  wage. For  further  details,  see Brainerd  (1992a,  1992b). David  Lipton and Jeffrey D.  Sachs  231 
than  the government  would  determine  the rise in prices  needed  to reduce 
real  money  balances  to a level consistent  with monetary  equilibrium.  At 
the beginning  of 1992,  most prices were freed from administrative  con- 
trol and allowed to rise freely. (The main  exception to price liberaliza- 
tion is energy, which regrettably  remains under administrative  con- 
trol.)30  At the same time, a presidential  decree on January  29, 1992, 
declared  that  all economic activity is permitted  unless expressly forbid- 
den, standing  on its head the Stalinist  dictum to the contrary.3'  Con- 
sumer prices rose by 250 percent in January  1992, with the prices of 
many goods rising  ten times or more.32  In the first three months of the 
year, the monetary  overhang  was eliminated,  the ruble money supply 
dropped to the range of 10 to 15 percent of GDP, and commodities 
started  to flow once again  through  formal  supply  networks  (rather  than 
through  black markets).33  Inflation  has subsequently  declined, but was 
still  around  9 percent  per month  by August 1992.  While  the liberalization 
of prices certainly  eliminated  Russia's monetary  overhang  and  restored 
the flow of commodities  in the state retail  outlets, stabilizing  prices re- 
30. Energy  prices  were  raised  administratively  at the  outset  of the reforms,  rather  than 
liberalized;  a second adjustment  was made  in May 1992;  and a further  liberalization  was 
announced  in mid-September.  In the summer  of 1992,  the price  of a ton of oil was about 
R2,000,  or about  $10  to $20,  or 10  to 20 percent  of the world  price.  The  failure  to liberalize 
oil prices  derived  from  the general  reluctance  to allow a more  dramatic  fall in production 
in heavy industry.  Russia  has suffered  greatly  for this decision. Energy  that might  have 
been exported  to alleviate  the balance  of payments  squeeze was squandered  to produce 
goods  that  no one wanted  or needed.  In  addition,  the  budget  went  without  a major  potential 
source  of revenue  in the midst  of a stabilization  crisis. The September  liberalization  is in- 
tended  to allow producers  to negotiate  prices  freely, and (given  the export  regime)  is ex- 
pected  to lead  to an increase  in crude  oil prices  to about  R5,200. 
31. As one Russian  wit put it, "In the Soviet Union, almost everything  was forbid- 
den ...  and  those few things  that  were permitted  were compulsory." 
32. IMF  (1992b,  p. 18).  The large  initial  increase  in prices  came as a surprise  to many 
observers,  and, in particular,  to the International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF), which had re- 
peatedly  argued  that  the monetary  overhang  was modest  in size and  that  the price  increase 
would be smaller.  In fact, the IMF consistently  underestimated  the monetary  pressures 
throughout  Eastern  Europe,  and  did so again  in Russia.  The IMF  and  others  calculated  in 
early 1991  that a 45 percent  price increase  would eliminate  the overhang  (Joint  Study, 
1991,  p. 392);  later  the Fund  suggested  that  part  of the overhang  probably  had  been elimi- 
nated  by inflation  over the course  of 1991. 
33. Needless to say, shortages  intensified  for the commodities  that remained  con- 
trolled.  In particular,  the queues  for milk  lengthened  so drastically  that  much  of the popu- 
lation  at first  did not experience  a net reduction  in queuing.  In reaction,  the government 
removed  the remaining  controls  in the course of several months, leaving  municipalities 
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quires control over the subsequent  creation  of money. The main chal- 
lenge facing the Russian  authorities  after the liberalization  has been to 
slow dramatically  the rate of growth  of the ruble  money supply  and, in 
that way, bring  down the rate of inflation  and strengthen  the external 
value of the ruble. 
The record  so far  has been mixed. Monetary  policy prevented  the ini- 
tial  jump  in prices  from  turning  into a runaway  inflation,  and  inflation  fell 
gradually  to about 10 percent per month by July. The extreme break- 
down  in the use of the ruble  was reversed  and  monetary  conditions  made 
possible a return of goods to  the shops. At  the same time, price 
and exchange  rate stabilization  were not achieved. And as is explained 
below, credit policy has been relaxed to a dangerous  degree in recent 
months,  presenting  a real risk  of destabilization. 
Price liberalization  and macroeconomic  measures were combined 
with other far-reaching,  though  partial, steps of market  liberalization. 
Additional  liberalization  measures  have begun  to open up internal  trade 
to individuals  and enterprises, scaled back state orders (by which the 
government  requires  deliveries of goods at administratively  set prices 
rather  than  contract  prices), and set out the legal foundation  for private 
sector  economic  activity. Where  state  orders  remain,  compliance  is gen- 
erally  low, mainly  because no effective form of compulsion  exists, and 
because market  opportunities  now provide  a strong  diversion. 
Market  liberalization  is still far from complete, and the steps that 
have been taken, albeit large, still fall short of the comparable  actions 
taken  in Eastern  Europe.34  Most trade  in manufactured  goods has been 
liberalized,  but extensive restrictions  remain  on the export of most raw 
materials  and  some semifinished  products  (in a costly attempt  to protect 
domestic industries  that use raw materials).  A significant  proportion  of 
interenterprise  distribution  remains  subject  to central  allocation,  at least 
formally. State trading  organizations  are still restricted  in their retail 
markups  to 25 percent  above costs, a practice  that  undoubtedly  contin- 
ues to restrict  the flow of some goods in state retail  outlets.35  And even 
where the federal  government  has removed  barriers,  regional  and local 
governments  often intervene  in trade  and impose bureaucratic  restric- 
tions on entry, thereby  encouraging  corruption  and  kickbacks. 
34. Aslund  (1992b)  stresses  this point  forcefully. 
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One  area  where  the state  order  system has continued  to pose a serious 
obstacle is in trade among the newly independent  states. Rather  than 
creating  mechanisms  for market-based  trade  between states at the start 
of the year, trade  protocols were negotiated  with each state to govern 
nearly  all interstate  trade.  These protocols  were naively conceived, and 
predictably  have not been fulfilled. More distressingly, market-based 
trade  has not adequately  substituted  for the debacle of the trade  proto- 
cols, largely  because of the failure  to develop satisfactory  monetary  re- 
lations  among  the new states (see below). While  data  on interstate  trade 
are unreliable,  a collapse of trade  volumes appears  to have occurred  so 
far  this year. 
Stabilization  Policy 
We now examine  the stabilization  crisis more  closely, looking  first  at 
fiscal  policy and  then at monetary  policy. From  the outset of the reform, 
the main  goal of fiscal policy has been to reduce to a very low level the 
amount  of money being  issued to support  the budget  deficit. To achieve 
this goal, the Gaidar  government  faced enormous  obstacles, including 
the heritage  of the communist  fiscal system, the complete  financial  col- 
lapse experienced last year, and the weakening  of traditional  revenue 
sources that is inherent  in the shift to a market  economy. With  revenue 
sources dropping  sharply,  the key steps were sharp  cuts in spending  on 
subsidies, armaments,  and budgetary  expenses for enterprise invest- 
ments  and  the introduction  of a 28 percent  value added  tax (VAT). 
Despite the obstacles to fiscal control, the government's strategic 
goal of reducing the inflationary  finance of the budget was largely 
achieved  in the first  half  of 1992.  The domestic  finance  of the budget  was 
reduced  from  about  20 percent  of GDP  in 1991  to about  2 percent  of GDP 
in the first  half of 1992.36  Viewed another  way, monetary  finance  of the 
budget deficit raised the beginning-of-the-year  stock of high-powered 
money by only 17 percent. The reduction in inflationary  finance was 
partly  achieved by a buildup  of domestic arrears,  and much more im- 
portantly,  of administrative  limitations  on spending  that had been ap- 
36. IMF  (1992a,  p. 70) and  government  of Russia.  The government  also provided  un- 
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proved  by the parliament.  These administrative  measures  were taken  in 
view of tax revenues that came in much  below target.  In the third  quar- 
ter, however, the government  made extensive concessions to industry 
and  certain  regions,  leading  to much  greater  money  financing  of the bud- 
get. The final  data  are not yet in, but it appears  that  the money financing 
may have amounted  to as much as one third  of quarterly  GDP. If this 
new direction of monetary  policy were to continue, the gains will be 
completely  dissipated  by hyperinflation. 
Fiscal policy will remain  a deep source  of crisis for several  years, un- 
til a new fiscal  basis for the state can be consolidated.  With  the collapse 
of the Soviet state  has come an abrupt  collapse  of revenues,  from  around 
37 percent  of Soviet GNP in 1990  to around  24 percent  of Russian  GNP 
in the first  quarter  of 1992.37  This is largely  a desirable  trend  as the state 
removes itself from  deep intervention  in the economy. However, as we 
have witnessed in Eastern  Europe, the collapse of revenues can easily 
outpace the politically achievable cutback in expenditures,  especially 
when the newly democratic  state is facing  strong  demands  for increased 
social spending. 
To avoid a chronic fiscal crisis, progress is needed on two fronts. 
First, the VAT and new income taxes covering  the private  sector must 
be vigorously  implemented  to replace  the disappearance  of the old main- 
stay of the system, the turnover  and profits  taxes on state enterprises. 
Second, the government  must move toward a new fiscal federalism  in 
which a much greater share of governmental  responsibilities  are allo- 
cated to local governments,  with local taxes providing  the basis of fi- 
nance. It is almost surely the case that local governments  will increas- 
ingly resist the transfer  of tax revenues to the center. (Already, key 
regions have had great success in obtaining  tax exemptions.) Rather 
than  fighting  this inevitable  trend,  the federal  government  would  be wise 
to devolve many  of its responsibilities  to the regions. 
Monetary Policy 
The monetary  overhang  that Gaidar  faced at the end of 1991  was cre- 
ated not only by the monetization  of the budget  deficit, but also by the 
extension of a huge amount  of cheap credit to state enterprises  by the 
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Central  Bank  of Russia  (CBR)  in the course  of 1991.  As the Soviet Union 
disintegrated,  Gosbank  of the Soviet Union provided  the government 
the credit  it needed  to cope with the collapsing  state finances.  The CBR, 
eager  to find  a role for itself, became  the champion  of the emerging  com- 
mercial  banking  sector and its state enterprise  clients. With  wholesale 
price  inflation  at about 140  percent  in 1991  (measured  from  the beginning 
to the end of the year)38  and CBR rediscounts charging  interest rates 
from  6 to 9 percent,39  the CBR  managed  to extend R297  billion  in credit 
(amounting  to 58 percent  of the beginning-of-year  stock of ruble  money) 
to the nongovernment  sphere, which was willingly scooped up by the 
commercial  banks. 
With  the demise  of the Soviet Union, the closure  of Gosbank,  and  the 
emergence  of new central  banks in each independent  state, stabilizing 
the ruble  requires  converting  the Central  Bank of Russia into an effec- 
tive monetary authority  for the ruble area. This would entail several 
steps; some of these measures  have been taken, while others have not. 
The CBR  began  the year  by ending  its practice  of extending  unlimited 
credits to commercial  banks. The central bank raised its finance rate 
from  6 percent  to 20 percent  in January  1992,  and after  a few months  to 
50  percent  and  eventually  80 percent,  and  phased  in a 20 percent  reserve 
requirement  for short-term  commercial  bank deposits. These changes, 
although  inadequate  in the face of the stabilization  problem  confronting 
Russia, represented  a revolutionary  change in the management  of the 
monetary  system. 
What was also needed, following the elimination  of the monetary 
overhang,  was a credit program,  backed up by realistic  interest rates, 
that  would  limit  the creation  of rubles, maintain  monetary  balance, and 
support  the stabilization  of prices and the exchange rate. With a tight 
credit  program,  state  enterprises  would  be forced  to finance  themselves, 
rather  than  rely on an unending  stream  of credits. To acquire  rubles,  en- 
terprises  would be forced to liquidate  inventories,  to dip into bank  bal- 
ances, and (given  the overly depreciated  exchange  rate for the ruble)  to 
repatriate  foreign currency holdings and boost exports. Given these 
considerations,  a tight credit program  was key to ending the shortage 
economy, getting goods back on the shelves, and ending the extreme 
weakness  of the ruble. 
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The industrial  sector, however, clamored  for credits,  arguing  that  the 
government's  policies had  unduly  restricted  liquidity.  The industrialists 
pointed  out that the real value of working  capital  and other credits out- 
standing  had  fallen  sharply  in the first  few months  of the year  and  argued 
that  this  jeopardized  their  ability  to produce.  They cited the rapid  accu- 
mulation  of interenterprise  arrears  as evidence that central  bank  credit 
policy was too tight-despite  the fact that the arrears  arose for many 
reasons, including  a breakdown  of the payments  system and  the simple 
fact that many enterprises in heavy industry, and particularly  in the 
MIC, simply  lacked  customers. 
The CBR  attempted  to chart  an intermediate  course, neither  commit- 
ting  itself to establishing  price stability  nor  adopting  a policy of restoring 
enterprise  liquidity.  The failure  to adopt a well-defined,  disinflationary 
credit  program-which might  have served as a framework  for the many 
individual  credit decisions that arose-left  the CBR vulnerable  to the 
steady drumbeat  of demands  for credits to industry  and other priority 
sectors coming  from the parliament  and the public. The result was the 
provision  of R457  billion  in finance  credits  from  the CBR  to commercial 
banks  over the first  half  of the year, an  amount  approximately  equivalent 
to the stock of high-powered  money at the beginning  of the year. These 
credits  exceeded by far the monetization  of the budget  deficit  and were 
mainly  responsible  for the slow progress  in bringing  down the rate  of in- 
flation,  which has for the most part  been in the range  of 10  to 30 percent 
per month. 
The credit creation has certainly accelerated in the third quarter. 
Starting  in July, industrialists  stepped  up the pressure  for credits  to sup- 
port their enterprises,  many of which were proving  unable  to meet the 
test of the market.  These industrialists  found willing  allies in the CBR, 
and, in the third  quarter  of the year, the credits extended exceeded the 
total amount  of base money existing  at the beginning  of the quarter.  The 
result, predictably,  has been a rise in the rate  of inflation  and a collapse 
in the external value of the ruble, to a point where a U.S. dollar now 
costs nearly  R400. Because of this credit  policy, the earlier  gains have 
been reversed  and  Russia  now faces a real  risk of hyperinflation. 
MANAGING  THE  RUBLE  AREA.  While CBR credit  expansion  within 
Russia  has been the main  obstacle to stabilization,  the  job of the central 
bank is complicated by several other factors, the most important  of 
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the states of the FSU. For monetary  policy to be effective and for the 
stabilization  effort  to succeed, there  must  be a single  monetary  authority 
with  control  over the instruments  of monetary  policy. When  the reforms 
began,  each of the fifteen  independent  states had  a central  bank  with the 
ability  to exercise an important  degree  of control  over monetary  policy. 
Moscow maintained  physical control over the printing  presses for cur- 
rency  issue, but  many states introduced  coupons or other  currency  sub- 
stitutes.  Moreover,  under  the interstate  payments  system that  prevailed 
in the first  half of 1992,  bank  credits created  outside of Russia could be 
spent  in Russia,  resulting  in the monetization  of Russia's  trade  surpluses 
and  the importation  of demand  pressures  from  neighboring  states. 
In our view, there is no realistic  possibility of controlling  credit in a 
system in which several independent  central  banks  each have the inde- 
pendent  authority  to issue credit.  The reason  is simple.  Pressure  is over- 
whelming  in each of the states to "free  ride"  by issuing ruble  credits at 
the expense of the rest of the system. It is a nearly  self-evident  proposi- 
tion that a single currency  area should have a single bank of issue. As 
Milton  Friedman  argues: 
The key feature  of a unified  currency  area  is that  it has at most one central  bank 
with the power  to create money-"at  most"  because no central  bank  is needed 
with  a pure  commodity  currency.  The U.S. Federal  Reserve System  has twelve 
regional  banks,  but there  is only one central  authority  (the Open  Market  Invest- 
ment  Committee)  that  can create  money. [Similarly,]  Scotland  and  Wales  do not 
have central  banks.40 
In our view, each of the independent  states should  quickly  introduce 
its own currency  by substituting  new banknotes  (or coupons)  for the ru- 
bles in circulation  in the state, and by redenominating  bank balances, 
contracts,  wages, and  prices in the new currency  at a uniform  exchange 
rate between the ruble and the new currency.  Trade  between the state 
and Russia could continue to be conducted in Russian  rubles, but the 
state would have to earn the rubles by its own exports or by explicit 
credits  from  Russia, or get them by selling  foreign  exchange  for rubles. 
If the state  wanted  to maintain  close monetary  harmonization  with Rus- 
sia, it could peg its currency  to the ruble. Otherwise,  the state could let 
its currency  float  against  the ruble  (and  perhaps  peg it to something  else, 
such as a Western  convertible  currency). 
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When  faced with the question of how the ruble  area should  be man- 
aged, the IMF has been extremely  unhelpful.  Convinced  at first  that  the 
best way to preserve interstate  trade  was to retain  as large  a ruble  area 
as possible, the IMF in early 1992  urged  all the independent  states to re- 
main  in the ruble  area.  Once  the inadequacy  of budget  and  credit  policies 
in certain states became clear, the IMF worried that new currencies 
might  be unstable  and  encouraged  the states to delay the introduction  of 
their  new moneys, ignoring  the inescapable  implication  that macroeco- 
nomic  policy mismanagement  outside of Russia  would  only serve to un- 
dermine  the ruble stabilization  effort! Finally in April 1992, the IMF 
proposed  a system for managing  the ruble  area  that  would have permit- 
ted each central  bank  to issue rubles  and  relied  upon  multilateral  negoti- 
ations to reach an acceptable  credit  plan. Russia rejected  this proposal 
as inadequate.  Nonetheless, the IMF continued  to advise other states 
to delay introducing  their own currencies,  and has provided  almost no 
technical  assistance  on this critical  issue. 
In the absence  of helpful  Western  guidance,  the ruble  area  issue came 
to a head in June  as several  independent  states proceeded  with plans to 
print  local currencies  (that  would substitute  for the ruble)  and  to extend 
ruble  credits. The most troubling  news was Ukraine's  announcement  in 
June of 1992  of its intention  to proceed-unilaterally and without con- 
sultation-on  an enormous  credit  expansion  (between R300  billion  and 
R600  billion of high-powered  money), in order  to settle interenterprise 
arrears.  This massive amount  of credit  issue threatens  to worsen  greatly 
the inflation  in Russia unless the moneys of Ukraine and Russia are 
quickly  separated. 
The Russian  authorities  have responded  by beginning  a process that 
will force a separation  of the Russian  ruble  from  the moneys of other  in- 
dependent  states. A decree in July halted  the automatic  crediting  of in- 
dependent  states running  trade  deficits  with Russia and  established  that 
Russian  goods could only be purchased  with ruble deposits in Russian 
banks. Ukrainian  importers  could not buy Russian  goods with Ukrain- 
ian bank deposits granted  by the Ukrainian  central  bank. Instead they 
now have to acquire  ruble  deposits  in Russian  banks  from  Ukrainian  ex- 
porters,  who have been credited  for their  export shipments.  Fully insti- 
tuted, this system would  create  a truly  Russian  ruble  and  insulate  Russia 
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Estonia demonstrated  that this process can be planned and com- 
pleted in a few weeks. (The IMF originally  urged  the Estonians  to delay 
until 1993;  now the IMF rightly  heralds  the steps taken  by Estonia.) In 
early  June, Estonia replaced  rubles  with a new banknote,  the kroon, at 
a rate of 10 rubles per kroon. The kroon was pegged to the deutsche 
mark  (DM) at a fixed rate of 8 kroon per DM (which was slightly  more 
depreciated  than  the black  market  price  of 75 rubles  per  DM)." All other 
prices and  accounts  were converted  at the same  rate. Trade  with Russia 
now continues in both hard currencies and rubles. A ruble market 
should  develop  in Estonia's  capital  of Tallinn,  in which  Estonian  export- 
ers to Russia sell their  ruble  earnings  to would-be  importers  for kroons. 
The kroon-ruble  rate floats freely, and the kroon has appreciated  to 20 
rubles  per kroon  as of September  1992.42 
RUSSIAN  FINANCIAL  SUPPORT  TO THE  OTHER  REPUBLICS.  One of 
the great  burdens  on the Russian  economy has been the implicit  or ex- 
plicit subsidization  of the other republics.  The main  form of subsidiza- 
tion has been the exchange  of energy  products  from  Russia  for manufac- 
tured  goods from  the other  republics  at terms  of trade  that substantially 
underpriced  the energy in comparison  with world markets. A second 
form  of subsidization  has been the extension  of credits  to other  republics 
through  the banking  system to finance  chronic  trade  deficits  of many  of 
the republics  vis-a-vis  Russia.  A third  form  of subsidization  has been the 
provision  of foreign  exchange to other republics, at a price in terms of 
rubles  far below the market  price. Only the third  form of subsidization 
has been substantially  eliminated  this year. 
The Gaidar  economic team announced  its intentions  to eliminate  the 
heavy transfer  burdens  on Russia  at the start  of the reforms,  but in fact, 
Russia  has continued  to bear  an  enormous  cost vis-a-vis  the other  repub- 
lics. Barter  trade  agreements  between Russia and  the other states were 
maintained  in 1992,  contrary  to the overall  thrust  of the reforms.  While 
this barter  system has largely  collapsed  in practice  (for  want of enforce- 
ment and financial  mechanisms),  Russia has continued  to oblige its en- 
ergy producers  to deliver  oil and  gas to the other states at energy  prices 
far below world levels. In some cases, these oil shipments  have in fact 
41. Hansson  and  Sachs  (1992). 
42. Hansson  and  Sachs  (1992). 240  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
been reexported to world markets, allowing enterprises in the other 
states to capture  an enormous  rent. 
Russia  also continues  to provide  enormous  credits  to the other  repub- 
lics to purchase  Russian  output. The CBR has credited  the accounts of 
the republican  central  banks, which in turn  have credited  the accounts 
of  enterprises and banks in the independent states. These credits 
amount  to more than one-third  of the overall increase in Russian  high- 
powered money during  January-June  1992, almost half of which was 
extended  to Ukraine  alone.43 
RUBLE  CONVERTIBILITY.  As conceived by the reformers,  the Rus- 
sian monetary  reforms  also aimed  to make the ruble  a usable currency 
in international  trade  and  financial  transactions.  Currency  convertibility 
was seen as the necessary  first  step in a process that  would  end Russia's 
economic isolation  and  lead to integration  with the world  economy. By 
ending  the chronic  overvaluation  of the ruble, exports would be stimu- 
lated  and  imports  would  be available  on a market  basis. Domestic  prices 
of  import-competing  goods would be  disciplined by world market 
prices. In the long  run,  convertibility  would  enhance  the inflow  of goods, 
capital,  and  technology,  and  thereby  accelerate  the process of economic 
transformation  and  development. 
Under the communist  economic system, the official exchange rate 
was consistently maintained  at an overvalued level and foreign ex- 
change  was rationed.  At the same  time, the domestic  economy was insu- 
lated from the influences  of international  markets  through  a system of 
adjustable  trade  equalization  taxes and subsidies that removed the dif- 
ference between fixed domestic and world  prices for all enterprises  en- 
gaging  in international  trade.  As a result, domestic  prices  bore no partic- 
ular relationship  to world prices and no rationality  existed in Russia's 
international  trade pattern. The system imposed a heavy anti-export 
bias because of the currency  overvaluation. 
The reforms  of 1992  have moved Russia  toward  convertibility.  First, 
trade equalization  taxes have been eliminated. However, energy and 
raw  materials  prices  are still  kept  below world  prices  by export  taxes and 
quotas. These taxes and quotas  are to be eliminated  in the coming  year, 
43. Government  of Russia.  One partial  offset to these credits  has been arrears  in pay- 
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which  will force domestic  energy  prices  to move up to world  levels. Sec- 
ond, the ruble has been permitted  to float in a twice-weekly interbank 
auction  market,  where enterprises  may buy foreign  exchange  to obtain 
imports.  For the first  half  of 1992,  several  exchange  rates  existed for cur- 
rent account transactions.  On the export side, the CBR maintained  a 
quasi-market  rate somewhat  more appreciated  than the interbank  auc- 
tion rate  and  demanded  that  energy  and  raw materials  exporters  surren- 
der  foreign  exchange  at the punitive  rate  of 50 percent  of the quasi-mar- 
ket rate." On the import side, the central bank continued to supply 
foreign  exchange  for various  crucial  "centralized  imports"  at a price  far 
below the market  exchange  rate  (on the order  of one-sixth  of the market 
price).45  In this way, imports  of grains,  other  foodstuffs,  and some other 
consumer  goods were enormously  subsidized. 
On July 1, the CBR moved to unify the exchange rate system by be- 
ginning  to set the official  exchange  rate  at the level prevailing  in the most 
recent auction and by eliminating  all surrender  by exporters  at below- 
market  rates. The government  also committed  to end the subsidization 
of centralized  imports  through  below-market  exchange rates, although 
it declared  its intention  to continue some subsidies  through  the budget. 
Foreign  enterprises  were also guaranteed  the right  to repatriate  profits  at 
the market  exchange  rate.  With  these moves, Russia  established  current 
account  convertibility  for the first  time since 1917.  Exporters  are  in prin- 
ciple required  to repatriate  foreign exchange earnings to Russia, al- 
though  they may hold some of these earnings  as foreign exchange ac- 
counts in Russian banks. In fact, there is evidence of considerable 
capital  flight,  with enterprises  holding  large  deposits offshore. 
While convertibility  will boost exports and rationalize  imports, the 
exchange  rate  remains  deeply undervalued  by any plausible  measure  of 
productivity  or purchasing  power; the dollar  value of industrial  wages 
was about  $30  per  month  at the end of August 1992.  Moreover,  the nomi- 
nal value of the ruble  has been unstable,  and since August  has depreci- 
ated  from  R130  per dollar  to nearly  R400  per dollar.  The weakness in the 
ruble stems from two factors. First, the CBR continues to grant  huge 
credits to support  Russia's industrial  sector, which both fuel inflation 
and  encourage  capital  flight.  The currency  will not strengthen  apprecia- 
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bly until  rubles  are scarce  enough  to encourage  enterprises  to supply  for- 
eign  exchange  in the marketplace  in order  to obtain  money  to pay wages 
and meet operating  expenses. Second, Russia continues  to face an ex- 
treme balance  of payments  crisis. It is the extreme shortage  of foreign 
exchange resources that is reflected  in the deeply depreciated  floating 
exchange  rate. The government's  aim  of pegging  the exchange  rate and 
providing  a nominal  anchor  to the price stabilization  effort will not be 
possible until  these two factors  leading  to the weakness of the ruble  are 
overcome. 
FURTHER  MONETARY  REFORMS.  Additional  obstacles to the man- 
agement  of the banking  system  and  the stabilization  of the currency  stem 
from the heritage  of the old system.46  The first  obstacle to stabilization 
is the lack of central  bank independence,  an issue we take up later. A 
second obstacle that  has hindered  the operation  of the monetary  system 
is the centrally controlled settlements system for transfers between 
banks, which has led to long delays in settlements  among  enterprises. 
The third  important  obstacle to the management  of the monetary  sys- 
tem is the payments mechanism,  with its sharp  division between cash 
money and noncash money (deposit rubles). This mechanism was 
phased  out in Eastern  Europe  in the early 1980s,  but remains  in Russia. 
In fact, two interlocking  circuits for payments exist. The population 
pays cash for retail  purchases;  this cash, in turn, is channeled  to enter- 
prises for the sole purpose  of paying  wages to employees. Meanwhile, 
state enterprises  use noncash money for all transactions  among them- 
selves. (Retail  enterprises  surrender  their  cash and  are credited  with de- 
posit rubles, which make  their  way up the production  stream.)  The con- 
sequence  of these two payments  circuits  is that  the banking  system does 
not serve the most basic function taken for granted  in a market  econ- 
omy: allowing  the depositor  to withdraw  deposits in the form  of cash.47 
Nor does cash serve its most basic function,  as legal tender  for all trans- 
actions  in the economy. We have made  recommendations  elsewhere  for 
ending  this division  and  regard  it as a matter  of urgency. 
46. The  following  section  is based  on our 1992  paper  (Sachs  and  Lipton, 1992). 
47. This  convertibility  of bank  money  into currency  and  vice versa  is considered  such 
a central  role of a banking  system that  it is rarely  even questioned.  The primary  function 
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The  fourth  obstacle  to monetary  management  has been the accumula- 
tion during the first half of  1992 of massive interenterprise  arrears, 
reaching  about  R3 trillion  (the equivalent  of about  70 percent  of nominal 
GDP  in the six-month  period).  These arrears  pose a great  danger  for the 
authorities  because they have been widely and inaccurately  interpreted 
as indicating  the inadequacy  of liquidity  in the economy and  have led to 
repeated  calls for massive credits  to allow arrears  to be cleared. 
It is now clear that many factors have combined  to create the inter- 
enterprise  arrears  problem;  we have mentioned  several  of these already. 
Final demand  has fallen more than production,  as heavy industry  has 
continued  to produce, even in the absence of customers. Additionally, 
the archaic  settlements  system for clearing  transfers  between banks  led 
to long delays and  prevented  enterprises  from  paying  their  suppliers  be- 
cause of a lack of receipts from their own customers. The breakdown 
of settlements  with the other independent  states has been particularly 
severe-clearing  between Russian and non-Russian enterprises can 
take up to two months-and  may face political  obstacles. Incentives to 
clear arrears  have been nearly  absent. Enterprises  in arrears  have been 
able to pay or even to raise wages, and interest  charges  on arrears  have 
been negligible,  creating  an incentive to delay payments. Finally, from 
the side of suppliers, satisfactory sales-verification  mechanisms  have 
been lacking; a system of bills of exchange, letters of credit, bank 
checks, and so forth does not yet exist to allow shippers  to guarantee 
that they will be paid by suppliers. And without bankruptcy  mecha- 
nisms, very limited  means  exist to enforce debt contracts. 
A strategy  for solving the arrears  problem should have three aims. 
First, it should  prevent existing arrears  from unduly  depressing  the fu- 
ture  production  of healthy  enterprises.  Second, it should  introduce  mea- 
sures  to stop the accumulation  of new arrears.  Third,  it should  provide  a 
way to settle the existing  arrears.  The  Russian  government  has  proposed 
that the repayment  of existing arrears  be postponed  for one year, with 
the goal of preventing  these arrears  from  destroying  future  production.48 
48. The arrears  would be converted  into formal  debts under  the control  of the State 
Property  Committee  (GKI). Debtors would owe money to the agency, while creditors 
would  have  a claim  on the agency.  Payments  by the agency  would  be limited  to the  amount 
of collections  from debtors. Enterprises  unable  to clear their  debts would be subject  to 
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Many  firms  lack the liquidity  needed  both to pay off their  arrears  and  to 
buy inputs for future  production.  By postponing  the repayment  of ar- 
rears, firms  are given the opportunity  to continue current  production. 
The central  bank, on the other hand, has pushed  for credit  increases to 
clear  the arrears,  a move resisted  by the government  as highly  inflation- 
ary. The struggle  between these two approaches  is as yet unresolved.49 
A Summing-up of the Macroeconomic  Results 
After inheriting  a disastrous financial  and monetary situation, the 
Russian  government  took several crucial  and bold moves in an attempt 
to stabilize  the economy and move to a market-based  system. Price  lib- 
eralization  combined  with fiscal restraint  succeeded in bringing  goods 
back to the shops and breaking  the back of hyperinflation.  While price 
stabilization  was not achieved, inflation  was reduced to 10 percent by 
July 1992,  after  a 245  percent  monthly  increase  in January.  The depreci- 
ation of the ruble  exchange rate, which began in August 1992,  resulted 
from  the ill-advised  relaxation  of credit  policy in the third  quarter  of the 
year, which now  jeopardizes  the survival  of the economic team and  the 
process of economic reform. 
The government  and  the Central  Bank  of Russia  faced intense politi- 
cal attacks  from  the start,  with charges  that  the reforms  had  devastating 
effects on industrial  production,  living standards,  and unemployment. 
The charges  were off-base, but nonetheless  they contributed  to pushing 
the macroeconomic authorities into unsatisfactory compromises by 
midyear, resulting  in a renewed rapid  growth of the money supply, a 
steep fall of the exchange  rate, and  renewed  risks  of hyperinflation.  Par- 
ticularly  inflationary  policy moves were taken by the Central  Bank of 
Russia  in the third  quarter  of 1992.  The CBR  has also failed  to make suf- 
ficient headway in resolving the ruble area crisis. The bank took im- 
portant  steps to separate  the Russian ruble from bank credit issued in 
other states, but then undermined  the effect of this action  by continuing 
49. Steps are also being taken to stop the accumulation  of new arrears  through  im- 
provements  in  the settlements  system  for  transfers  between  enterprises.  Moreover,  penal- 
ties are to be levied on enterprises  accruing  new arrears  (including  limits on wages and 
high  interest  rates  on the arrears).  Bankruptcy  proceedings  may  be initiated  and  should  be 
imposed  on enterprises  that cannot  pay off the old arrears  and that continue  to generate 
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Table  6. The Decline  in Industrial  Production  in Economies  in Transition,  1990-92 
Percent  per year, except where indicated 
Cumulative 
change, 
Country  1990  1991  1992a  1989-92b 
Albania  - 7.5  - 43.0  ..  .  - 47.3 
Bulgaria  -16.8  -  11.2  - 26.9  -46.0 
Czechoslovakia  - 3.5  - 24.7  -  10.0  - 34.6 
East Germany  -  15.0  - 20.0  -  18.0  - 44.2 
Hungary  -8.4  -21.9  -  12.5  - 37.5 
Poland  - 24.1  -  19.6  - 3.8  -41.3 
Romania  -  14.3  -21.7  -18.5  - 45.3 
Russia  -2.6  -8.0  -20.0  -28.3 
Sources: World  Bank  (1992);  "International  Economic  Indicators:  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,"  Financial  Times, 
September  28, 1992,  p. 6; and  Biuletyn Statystyczny  (Monthly  Statistical  Bulletin),  various  issues. 
a. World  Bank projections  for 1992 are used for Czechoslovakia,  East Germany,  and Russia. For Bulgaria, 
Hungary,  Poland,  and Romania,  the 1992  figure  is based  on the percentage  change  from  the second quarter  of the 
year. 
b. Cumulative  change is calculated  from 1989  through  the most recent period in 1992  for which the data are 
available. 
a policy of easy credits  to the other states, in amounts  that  have contrib- 
uted importantly  to the large  money growth  this year. 
The attacks  on the government  and  the central  bank  have missed the 
point. Industrial  production  declined  not because of an excessive credit 
squeeze, as widely charged,  but  because much  of the Russian  MIC  sim- 
ply lacks customers at this time. Russia's decline has in fact been 
smaller  than  the comparable  industrial  declines in Eastern  Europe  from 
1989  to 1992,  despite  the fact that  Russia  probably  requires  more  adjust- 
ment  than  the other  countries.  Table  6 compares  the decline  in industrial 
production  in Russia and Eastern Europe. As for the claim about real 
living standards,  we have already  suggested  that  the declines in real liv- 
ing standards  have been greatly  exaggerated  and wrongly  attributed  to 
the reforms  (more  on this below). Finally, the attack  on unemployment 
is both premature  and off the mark.  To date, there simply  has been no 
unemployment  to speak of, because it remains  well below 1 percent of 
the labor  force. Unemployment  will rise in the future,  particularly  in the 
transition  period. But as we discuss below, the service sector will ulti- 
mately expand to provide  jobs for workers  who, inevitably,  will be re- 
leased from  the industrial  sector. 
In sum, the reasons for the easing up of monetary  policy are uncon- 
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ernment  should spend less time worrying  about artificially  propping  up 
the enterprises  in heavy industry  and  the MIC.  The overall  social, politi- 
cal, and  economic  risks are simply  too large. 
The Social and Political Context of Reform 
Many  observers  are  deeply  pessimistic  about  Russia's  long-term  eco- 
nomic prospects. They fear that the reforms  initiated  this year simply 
cannot  be sustained.  A number  of reasons are offered. Some claim that 
the short-term  dislocations  of the economy are so great  as to guarantee 
a political  backlash  or even social explosion. Others  claim  that  Russia's 
distinctive  history and the character  of its people will prevent the effi- 
cient operation  of a market  system. Our own concerns lie elsewhere: 
with the risks for political instability  as a result of the partial  nature  of 
Russia's  political  and  institutional  reforms. 
Living Standards 
We have already  discussed the issue of the costs of the reforms in 
terms of lower living standards.  In our view, these costs are exagger- 
ated;  for that  reason, a generalized  social explosion is unlikely  to derail 
the reforms.  Of course, particular  groups  (such as the MIC  and hardlin- 
ers in the parliament)  might  slow or reverse  the reforms,  but  not because 
of economic  upheaval.S0 
This point is impossible  to prove precisely. Nonetheless, as former 
advisors  to the Polish government  and current  advisors to the Russian 
government,  we are struck  by the similarities  of broad  trends  in the two 
countries,  as well as the popular  interpretations  of these trends.  A much- 
predicted  social explosion never came to Poland, although  the country 
has had  many  strikes  and  protests. The overwhelming  fact is the steady, 
peaceful, and  democratic  progress  of the Polish  reforms-even  through 
several national  elections in which extremist  parties and militant  labor 
organizations  failed  to ignite  popular  discord. 
50. One risk arises  from  ethnic  conflicts,  particularly  in view of the 25 million  ethnic 
Russians  who now live in other  republics.  It is conceivable  that  nationalistic  pressures  to 
protect  these ethnic  Russians  could  boil over and  help  undermine  the new democratic  in- 
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Poland's living standards  are low, as they have been for decades 
under  communism.  What  we have stressed  is that  Poland's  alleged  drop 
of one-third  in living  conditions  was based on a superficial  interpretation 
of the change  in the statistical  real wage at the start  of Poland's  reform; 
this neglected the existence of shortages  and the fact that the wage de- 
cline was reversing  a previous  wage explosion. Andrew  Berg  and  Jeffrey 
Sachs have attempted  to  judge the change  in living standards  by looking 
directly  at changes  in consumer  purchases  from 1989  to 1990,  based on 
household  expenditure  surveys, rather  than misleading  real-wage  mea- 
sures.51  Berg and Sachs found that the decline in real consumption  was 
enormously  overstated  and  was on the order  of a 5 percent  drop, as op- 
posed to a 16 percent  decline in the national  income accounts and a 30 
percent  decline  in the average  real  wage. Bryan  Roberts  has recently  ar- 
gued  that  if one also takes into account  the end of queuing,  together  with 
the change  in consumption,  the overall effect of the price liberalization 
in Poland  was a rise in Polish  living standards  in 1990,  not a fall.52 
A survey conducted  in November 1991  asked 986 Poles between the 
ages of 18  and  65 to assess their  living  conditions  almost  two years after 
the start of the reforms.53  Their responses demonstrate  acceptance of 
the economic changes. More than four-fifths  of the respondents  held 
that their family's economic situation  was the same or better than five 
years before.54  This was at a time when the popular  press depicted the 
Poles as seething  with unhappiness  over the hardships  of the reforms. 
Similarly,  43 percent  of respondents  preferred  "an  economy  like  we now 
have"  to "a socialist economy like before the revolution,"  while 24 per- 
cent preferred the socialist economy, and 33 percent saw no dif- 
ference.55 
We do not yet have the data for this kind of study for Russia. The 
basic patterns  will likely be the same as in Poland.  However, we should 
highlight  two points. First, even if the reforms  per se do not reduce liv- 
ing standards  sharply,  the backdrop  is still one of a falling  trend  in such 
51. Berg  and  Sachs  (1992). 
52. Roberts(1992). 
53. Ammeter-Inquirer  (1992). 
54. Ammeter-Inquirer  (1992,  p. 18).  Nineteen  percent  of respondents  said  "much  bet- 
ter";  38 percent  said  "a  little  better";  25 percent  said  "much  the same";  15  percent  said  "a 
little  worse";  and  3 percent  said  "a  lot worse." 
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key sectors as energy. An income squeeze resulting  from trends that 
preceded the reforms might be widely blamed on the reforms them- 
selves. Also, it is likely the case that income inequality  has risen as a 
result of the reforms,  with pensioners  probably  being squeezed relative 
to younger  workers. 
In addition to the concern over average real consumption levels, 
there is widespread  fear that mass unemployment  will lead to a explo- 
sion of labor  unrest.  Once again,  these fears are exaggerated.  In Poland, 
predictions  of unemployment  rates of 20 to 30 percent  were widely pre- 
dicted. In fact, unemployment  in July 1992  was at 13.1 percent of the 
labor  force, but it is widely accepted that around  one-third  of the regis- 
tered unemployed  workers actually have work in the private sector.56 
Poland  has created  about  2 million  jobs in small  enterprises  (roughly  12 
percent  of the labor  force), mostly in the service sector.57  Simple  calcu- 
lations suggest  that  the expansion  of the Russian  service sector will also 
substantially  compensate for the declines in Russian heavy industrial 
employment. 
As a back-of-the-envelope  calculation  (using  data for the entire for- 
mer Soviet Union), note that total employment  in the FSU was about 
136  million  workers  in 1988,  of which  approximately  21.8 million  were in 
heavy industry  (fuels, power, metallurgy,  and machine  building),  while 
about 10.7  million  were in trade  and  distribution.58  If the share  of work- 
ers in trade  and  distribution  were to rise from  8 percent  of the labor  force 
to just 15  percent of the labor  force (which would still be far below the 
share  in typical  market  economies), about  9.6 million  newjobs would  be 
created  in trade  and distribution.  That  would be enough  to compensate 
for an employment  decline of 44 percent  in heavy industry,  which itself 
is likely to be an overestimate of the actual decline. Even in the best 
case, transitional  unemployment  will be substantial  as these shifts take 
place. But this, unfortunately,  is inevitable. 
The concern has been voiced that  job losses and  job needs will not 
match:  in some cases, company  towns will have to close or shrink  con- 
siderably,  without  scope for significant  increases  injobs in nonindustrial 
sectors. Concerns  have particularly  arisen  about  workers  in MIC  enter- 
56. Radio  Free Europe  (1992,  table  3, p. 52). 
57. Biuletyn  Statystyczny,  July 1992. 
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prises. Importantly,  though, the biggest concentrations  of the MIC en- 
terprises  are in the major  urban  areas, such as Moscow and St. Peters- 
burg-exactly  the places where new service enterprises  and consumer 
industries  are likely to develop.59  According  to Julian  Cooper, St. Pe- 
tersburg  alone accounts for nearly one-tenth  of the total MIC employ- 
ment,  about  700,000  workers  (in shipbuilding,  radio  and  ground-force  in- 
dustries,  and  missile and aviation  industries).60 
Is Russia  Different? 
Another key claim is that Russia is different-that  liberal reforms 
cannot  take hold there. It is true  that  Russia's history  poses a great  chal- 
lenge: can a country  with 1,000 years of autocratic  rule, which passed 
swiftly from feudal institutions to communism, now move swiftly to 
democratic  capitalism,  or will social mores  and  attitudes  block the proc- 
ess? Peter Reddaway  recently asserted, for example, that "shock  ther- 
apy"  cannot  work  because "Russia's  deeply Sovietized  political  culture 
is-and  even with sustained  Western  assistance, will be for a decade or 
two-highly  unsuited  to free markets,  entrepreneurism,  privatization, 
and  rule of law."  61 Of course, social science does not really  equip  us to 
give a definitive answer. We would rather stress how little evidence 
there  is in favor of the pessimistic  view.62 
First, many  countries  have embarked  on radical  market  reforms  from 
a social structure  that looked a priori  rather  unpromising,  only to over- 
come the "social"  factors. As Henry  Rosovsky noted in his scintillating 
study on "Japan's  Transition to Modern Economic Growth, 1868- 
59. Cooper  (1991)  reports  that  the top ten localities  in terms  of MIC  employment  are: 
Yekaterinberg;  St. Petersburg  (city);  Moscow  (city);  Nizhni-Novgorod;  Moscow  (oblast); 
Perm;  Samara;  Novosibirsk;  Tatarstan;  and  Udmurtiya. 
60. Cooper  (1991,  p. 24). 
61. Peter Reddaway,  "Next From Russia: 'Shock Therapy'  Collapse,"  Washington 
Post, July 12, 1992,  p. C7. 
62. Many  currents  of Russian  intellectual  thought  have  also stressed  the "uniqueness" 
of the Russian  character,  often  in  justification  of a revolutionary  ideology.  Historian  Rich- 
ard Pipes recalls how the "going  to the people movement"  of the late 19th  century  was 
predicated  in part  on the special,  and  presumably  revolutionary,  character  of the Russian 
muzhik.  As it turned  out, as Pipes  ironically  notes, the failure  of these intellectuals  "went 
deeper;  the 'toiling  masses' gave unmistakable  evidence of an acquisitive  spirit  of the 
worst  bourgeois  type. . ."  (Pipes, 1974,  p. 297).  In our  view, that  highly  desirable  acquisi- 
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1885,"  at the time of the Meiji  Restoration  "foreign  observers ...  were 
extremely  pessimistic"  about  the prospects  for Japan: 
With considerable  complacency  they wrote: "Wealthy  we do not think it will 
ever become:  the advantages  conferred  by Nature,  with  the exception  of the cli- 
mate  and  the love of indolence  and  pleasure  of the people themselves  forbid  it." 
Or, "The  national  banking  system of Japan  is but another  example  of the futility 
of trying  to transfer  Western  growth  to the Oriental  habitat.  In this part  of the 
world  principles,  established  and recognized  in the West, appear  to lose what- 
ever virtue and vitality they originally  possessed and to tend fatally towards 
weediness  and  corruption".63 
These charges of indolence and corruption  certainly  are familiar  in to- 
day's discussion. They also featured  prominently  in doubts  raised  about 
most of southeast  Asia in the 1950s  and 1960s,  before that region's re- 
markable  takeoff  of economic  growth. Similar  charges  and  doubts  were 
the staple  of discussions vis-a-vis Latin  America  until  the economic re- 
covery of several  Latin  American  countries  in recent years. 
Russia's supposed  uniqueness  with respect to social attitudes  about 
the market  economy is not borne out in recent survey data. Robert  J. 
Shiller,  Maxim  Boycko, and Vladimir  Korobov surveyed  Russians  and 
Americans  to see if they could find  significant  differences  in attitudes  to 
economic risk, incentives, initiative,  and so on. In their  hunt  for "homo 
sovieticus," the alleged Russian species that has been rendered  unable 
to respond to economic opportunities  because of 75 years of commu- 
nism, the authors  conclude that "the biggest obstacles to a successful 
transition  do not seem to lie in the basic attitudes  or psychological  traits 
held  by the people in the ex-communist  countries."  64Differences in eco- 
nomic choices between Russians and Americans seem to have much 
more to do with "situational  differences"  (incentives and institutions) 
than  with "attitudinal  differences."65 
Poland's recent experience casts further  doubt on the concept of 
homo sovieticus, because it was also alleged  that the communist  period 
there  had  deadened  the hand  of entrepreneurship.  This  idea has lost cur- 
rency in Poland  because of the remarkable  explosion of entrepreneur- 
ship since 1989. The number  of registered  individual  proprietorships 
nearly  doubled  from  813,500  on December  31, 1989,  to 1,523,400  on June 
63. Rosovsky (1966,  p. 132). 
64. Shiller  and  others  (1992,  p. 179). 
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30, 1992.  The increase of 709,900 small  business owners represents  al- 
most 5 percent of the working  population.  Total employment  in these 
enterprises  nearly  doubled  from 1,475,500  to 2,800,400, an increase of 
almost 9 percent of the total labor  force. As for larger  enterprises,  the 
number  of private commercial  law partnerships  (partnerships,  limited 
liability  companies, and  joint-stock companies)  more than quadrupled 
from 11,693  at the end of 1989  to 51,174  by mid-  1992.66 
In Russia, as in Poland,  important  differences  occur in the economic 
attitudes of different  age groups: younger individuals  are much more 
prone to support  the ideas of radical  economic change and to be more 
optimistic  about the future. Consider  table 7, which reports  the results 
of a January  1992  survey on Russians' attitudes  toward  private  owner- 
ship  and  privatization.67  Young  respondents  are much  more  disposed  to 
private ownership, the process of privatization,  the role of foreign in- 
vestors, and private land ownership than are the older respondents. 
Nonetheless, perhaps  the striking  point of the survey  is the overwhelm- 
ing support  for the basic ideas of the privatization  process. Of the total 
population,  65 percent  prefer  private  to state ownership  (31  percent  dis- 
agree);  58 percent  believe that  their  families  will be better  off if the state 
sells enterprises  to private  owners (23 percent  disagree);  52 percent  be- 
lieve that  their  families  will be better  off if foreigners  are allowed  to buy 
shares  in state enterprises  (29 percent  disagree);  and  fully 75 percent of 
the respondents  believe that their situation  will be improved  by private 
land  ownership  (11 percent  disagree).  Ironically,  it is on the question  of 
private  land  ownership  that the hardline  Congress  of People's Deputies 
has been most resistant to reform, despite the overwhelming  public 
support. 
Unfortunately,  it is not yet possible to get an accurate description 
about  the extent to which Russians  are now entering  private  market  ac- 
tivity for direct comparison  with the Polish experience. According  to 
the government  of Russia, the share  of the labor  force engaged  in state 
enterprises  fell sharply  between 1990  and 1991,  from  82.4  percent  to 77.2 
percent,  with employment  in leased enterprises,  joint stock companies, 
joint ventures, and private  organizations  rising  from 5.8 percent of the 
labor  force to 10.4 percent in one year.68  We suppose that the trend  is 
66. Biuletyn  Statystyczny,  June 1991  (pp. 57-58) and  September  1992  (pp. 89-90). 
67. Boeva and  Shironin  (1992). 
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Table  7. Russian  Attitudes  toward  Private  Ownership  and Privatization, 
January  1992 
Responses  in percent 
Age group 
Total 
Question  Under  30  30-59  Over  59  population 
1. State ownership  is the best way 
to run a business.  16  32  52  31 
An enterprise  is best run by 
entrepreneurs  producing  goods 
people want.  82  64  43  65 
Don't know.  2  4  4  4 
2. What  effect will the following 
have on your own family 
situation  if/when  the 
government: 
a. Sells state enterprises  to 
private  owners? 
Better off  75  57  37  58 
Worse off  11  24  40  23 
No difference  12  16  22  16 
Don't know  2  2  2  2 
b. Allows foreigners  to buy 
shares in state enterprises? 
Better off  70  52  26  52 
Worse off  15  28  50  29 
No difference  13  14  20  15 
Don't know  2  5  4  4 
c.  Most farming  is done by 
private  owners or on private 
land? 
Better off  86  75  61  75 
Worse  off  5  11  19  11 
No difference  8  12  17  12 
Don't know  1  2  2  2 
Source: Boeva and Shironin  (1992).  Based  on a survey  of 2,106  urban  Russians. 
accelerating,  although  1992  data  are not yet available.  Through  January 
1992, 8,900 small-scale privatizations  had occurred.69  Approximately 
5,000  joint ventures are now operating.  Six hundred  commodities ex- 
changes  are also operating  throughout  the country  as a major  wholesale 
network.  And it is anticipated  that  50 percent  to 70 percent  of industrial 
69. Kwon  (1992b,  p. 13). David Lipton and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  253 
capital will be converted into joint stock companies in the coming 
months. 
The Political  Context of Reform 
Throughout  Russian history, political liberalization  has unleashed 
considerable  initiative and economic development. This was true fol- 
lowing the post-Crimean War reforms of Tsar Alexander II, which 
ended serfdom,  fostered local representative  institutions  (the zemstvo, 
founded  in 1864),  and  established  an independent  judiciary  in the crucial 
legal reforms  of 1864.70 
This was also true in the post-1905  reforms  of Prime  Minister  Sergei 
Stolypin,  which encouraged  capitalistic  enterprise,  foreign  investment, 
and  private  land  ownership  among  the peasants.7'  It was once again  true 
in the New Economic  Policies of the 1920s,  following  the Russian  Revo- 
lution.  In no case was the problem  a lack of social or economic  response 
to the new freedoms. Rather,  in each case, the problem  was a political 
reversal  of the reforms.  Alexander  II was murdered  by terrorists  in 1881, 
ushering  in a period of repression  under Tsar Alexander  III. Stolypin 
was progressively undercut  by the conservative Third Duma and by 
Tsar Nicholas II, who feared a weakening  of autocratic  powers. Sto- 
lypin  was assassinated,  probably  by state security  forces, as his powers 
were ebbing  in 1911.  Even then, the progress  of land reform  continued 
until the outbreak  of World  War I. The New Economic Policies were 
killed by Stalin, who instituted  the murderous  collectivization  policies 
in the first  five-year  plan  in 1928. 
Stolypin  was no doubt  correct  in 1910  that  Russia  would  be "unrecog- 
nizable"  if it were  given ten years  of peace,72  and,  by implication,  contin- 
70. Solzhenitsyn  (1991)  speaks  sensitively  about  building  local  democratic  institutions 
on the basis of the zemstvo tradition. 
71. Schapiro  (1986,  p. 97)  describes  the success of the land  reforms.  "By 1916,  the last 
years  of the old regime,  nearly  two and a half  million  households,  or around  twenty-four 
per  cent of the total  number  of households  in forty  provinces  in European  Russia,  had  ob- 
tained  individual  proprietorship,  and  there  were nearly  three  quarters  of a million  applica- 
tions  pending.  With  the aid of the Land  Bank,  nearly  ten million  hectares  were  purchased 
by the peasants  from  the landed  gentry  between 1906  and 1915.  Resettlement  in Siberia, 
which  was part  of the Stolypin  land  reform,  was also successful, and  resulted  in the cre- 
ation  in new areas  of a prosperous  and  independent-minded  peasantry." 
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ued reforms.73  The process was stopped  by internal  conservative  resis- 
tance, and perhaps  more importantly  by the external  disaster  of World 
War I. The question today is whether the reforms will similarly be 
stopped  by internal  political  resistance  or external  shocks. In many  re- 
spects, the social and  cultural  context for reform  is better  now than  dur- 
ing  these earlier  episodes. Where  Stolypin  faced a largely  illiterate  popu- 
lation  consisting  overwhelmingly  of peasants, today's reformers  face an 
urbanized  and highly  literate  population,  with modern  communications 
and  media  to give voice to their  concerns.74  Nonetheless, Stolypin's  po- 
litical  demise serves to remind  us of several  of the most important  politi- 
cal risks now facing  the country. 
First, Stolypin  faced a conservative Duma (parliament),  which was 
heavily weighted toward the land-owning  gentry. Stolypin's reforms 
were not slowed by general social pressures-quite  the contrary-but 
by narrow  factional  resistance  given undue  weight  in the unreformed  ex- 
ecutive and legislative institutions.  Today, Gaidar's  government  faces 
a similar  brake  in the legislative bodies of the new state. The supreme 
legislative  body, the Congress  of People's Deputies, which meets twice 
a year, and  the smaller  standing  parliament,  the Supreme  Soviet, which 
draws  its representatives  from  the Congress  of People's Deputies, were 
elected in March  1990,  for five-year  terms. The elections were only par- 
tially  democratic;  the Communist  Party  still maintained  its monopoly  of 
power and organized  opposition  parties still were not tolerated. A sig- 
nificant  proportion  of candidates  were directly nominated  by Commu- 
nist Party  structures,  with little effective noncommunist  opposition.  An 
independent  Russian  state did not yet exist. 
As is well known, the parliament  is now divided  among  former  com- 
munist hardliners,  representatives of state industry (particularly  the 
MIC)  and state agriculture,  and radical  reformers.  The Gaidar  govern- 
ment  can count  reliably  upon  roughly  one-third  of the votes, though  it is 
often able to win a majority  by capturing  a proportion  of the industrial 
lobby, together  with the more  moderate  parts  of the ex-communist  con- 
73. According  to Acton  (1986,  p. 138),  "between  1909  and  1913,  industrial  growth  aver- 
aged 8 per  cent per annum  and  the rate  was accelerating  ....  The banking  structure  be- 
came more  sophisticated,  and  directed  increasing  sums  of domestic  capital  into industry, 
while  foreign  capital  continued  to flow into Russia." 
74. We are grateful  to Professor  Alfred  Rieber  of the University  of Pennsylvania  for 
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tingent.  The Supreme  Soviet voted in June, for example, to support  the 
government's  radical  privatization  measures, although  state managers 
still hope to capture  the process in the implementation  phase. The Con- 
gress of People's Deputies is even more  conservative  than  the Supreme 
Soviet. In its first session after  the start  of radical  economic reforms,  it 
refused  to support  the government's  constitutional  initiative  in support 
of private  land  ownership. 
While  Stolypin's  reforms  depended  heavily  upon  the support  of Nich- 
olas II, who was protective  of his autocratic  power, the Russian  govern- 
ment  reformers  are backed  by Russia's first  freely elected leader, Boris 
Yeltsin, a genuinely  popular  politician  attuned  to Russia's  needs for eco- 
nomic  and  democratic  modernization.  Yeltsin's support,  of course, is of 
decisive importance  at this stage, as the legitimate  democratic  force that 
can resist the paralysis inherent  in the legislative stalemate. Like the 
U.S. president, the Russian president  is a democratic  lightning  rod of 
the society. Yeltsin's continued support  for radical  reforms  will likely 
depend on his judgment of their social sustainability.  In the end, the 
point  that  we have stressed-that  living  standards  do not fall sharply  be- 
cause of price liberalization-may well prove decisive. President  Yelt- 
sin must  judge whether the reform  path is socially tolerable and ade- 
quately  supported. 
The special position of the "industrial  lobby"  merits  a further  obser- 
vation. During  the final  two years of the Gorbachev  regime  and  the first 
year of the new government, the state enterprise  managers  from the 
MIC  have been the most vocal and  best organized  political  force on the 
scene. During  1988-90,  this  group  lobbied  for protection  of its privileged 
access to resources and credits and fought successfully against  the im- 
plementation  of radical  economic  reforms.75  It is widely  believed  that  di- 
rect pressures  from the group  were successful in getting  Gorbachev  to 
back away from the Shatalin  500-Day Plan, which would have trans- 
formed the Soviet economy into a market  economy within 500 days, 
75. One of the most remarkable  features  of the Gorbachev  reforms  involved  the goal 
of military  conversion.  Instead  of assigning  defense  establishments  to civilian  ministers  to 
manage  the conversion,  the Gorbachev  strategy  was exactly  the reverse:  to assign  civilian 
enterprises  to the military-industrial  complex  (under  VPK control).  In the quest  of weak- 
ening  the grip  of the MIC  on the economy,  Gorbachev  actually  increased  the scope of the 
MIC,  with  the result  of further  delaying  the needed  changes!  See Cooper  (1991,  pp. 32-33) 
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starting  on October  1, 1990.  Some MIC state managers  were among  the 
key backers  of the August  putsch that sought  to overthrow  Gorbachev. 
A less reactionary  group  of state managers  (exemplified  by Arkady  Vol- 
sky, who managed  the industrial  sector at the end of the Gorbachev  re- 
gime) sided with Gorbachev  and Yeltsin in August 1991,  but have con- 
tinued to lobby aggressively  for a slowing down of reforms, and more 
recently  for a change  of government  and  abandonment  of radical  reform 
measures. 
The political weight of the MIC seems to depend more on Russia's 
unrepresentative  legislative institutions than on broad-based  support 
in the country. The position of the managers  is transparently  one of 
special-interest  lobbying  (in favor of manager-led  privatization,  low tax 
rates on industry, and continued cheap credits), rather  than a broad- 
based appeal  to the population.  Thus  the group  has  found  its key support 
among hardline  deputies in the Congress  of People's Deputies and the 
Supreme  Soviet, rather  than  among  the wider  population. 
Moreover, the state managers  hardly speak with a uniform  voice. 
Many managers  have by this time already  taken an ownership  position 
in one or more  private  firms  spun  off from  their  enterprises,  so they often 
have personal  stakes in the continuation  of market  reforms.  Many  MIC 
enterprises  played a key role in throwing  their support  behind Yeltsin 
during  the failed  putsch. Nonetheless, the anti-government  rhetoric  em- 
anating  from industrial  groups is likely to be very strong in coming 
months  because the managers  know that  the next few months  will be de- 
cisive in determining  their  personal  positions  in the privatized  economy. 
If they can gain control of the privatization  process, they believe that 
they are likely to win a much  bigger  part  of the pie. 
One  obvious  way forward  is through  new elections, although  here too 
the situation  is confused. President  Yeltsin  has so far  resisted  calling  for 
new parliamentary  elections, partly  because the power to call for new 
elections is unclear  and rests in part  or whole with the Supreme  Soviet 
itself. Also,  Yeltsin has argued that a new constitution should be 
adopted  first  (by referendum)  and  that  the profound  economic  instability 
should  be ameliorated.  These are  understandable,  if debatable,  proposi- 
tions. They set up the very dangerous  possibility, however, that the re- 
forms can still be hiUacked  by conservatives given vastly greater  influ- 
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Some Russians  and  foreign  observers  doubt  the efficacy  of free elec- 
tions in the Russian context. But as with the evidence about Russia's 
alleged  aversion  to the market,  the belief that Russians  care little about 
democratic  institutions  and favor strong authoritarian  governments  is 
also very questionable.  For example,  a recent  article  by Siberian  sociol- 
ogist Valentine  Nemirovsky explained that Siberians  overwhelmingly 
favor individual  initiative, a market  economy, and democratic  institu- 
tions. Citing a 1990 opinion survey among 1,200 young Siberian re- 
spondents, he reports  that 40 percent  favored a "multi-party  system of 
the Western  type," 32 percent  favored "a presidential  democracy  as in 
the U.S.A. ," 10  percent  favored  a government  "by  a strong  individual," 
and 18  percent  favored  "the  existing system.  "76 
The Case for  Further Political  Reform 
Even aside from new elections, the existing Russian  political insti- 
tutions  continue  to pose various  kinds  of risks to the success, or at least 
the degree of success, of the economic transformation.  At risk of dan- 
gerous oversimplification,  it may be worthwhile  to enumerate  the most 
serious  problems. 
POLITICAL  DECENTRALIZATION.  One of the reasons for the col- 
lapse of the Soviet Union was the inability  to manage  a vast centralized 
empire  from Moscow. Problems  in this regard  still remain,  on two lev- 
els. As we have pointed  out, Russia still has not abandoned  some of the 
main economic costs of the former  Soviet empire.  Russia can ill afford 
to continue this kind of subsidization  policy. Second, Moscow cannot 
realistically hope to govern a highly centralized Russian state, even 
stripped  of the burdens  of the other  republics.  The  tax base of the federal 
government  is shrinking  rapidly  as increasingly  powerful  regions  within 
the Russian  federation  demand  further  control  over their  resources.  The 
Federation  Treaty of April 1992  established  the growing  autonomy  of 
the regions,  but  it has not yet resulted  in a workable  federal  system. This 
will  become increasingly  urgent  in the next couple of years  as fiscal  pres- 
sures  intensify.  In Eastern  Europe,  the first  step toward  decentralization 
76. Reported  by Nemirovsky  (1992,  p. 4), concerning  the results  of a 1990  pubtic  opin- 
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was elections at the municipal,  regional,  or provincial  level. Such elec- 
tions should  be a high  priority  on the Russian  political  reform  agenda. 
CENTRAL  BANK  INDEPENDENCE.  The Central  Bank of Russia cur- 
rently reports  to the Russian  parliament.  Specifically,  the chairman  of 
the CBR  is appointed  by parliament  and  CBR  policies are subject  to ap- 
proval  by the parliament.  At the same time, in practice,  the CBR  is sub- 
ject to strong  pressures  from  the Russian  government.  Industry,  agricul- 
ture, and the energy sectors have each managed to  convince the 
government  to pressure  the CBR  into granting  credits. 
What  is clearly  needed is a set of legal arrangements  that  will free the 
CBR from the parliament  and the government, alike. History shows 
very clearly  that  the legal  arrangements  surrounding  a central  bank  play 
a critical  role in determining  central  bank  policies. The independence  of 
the German  Bundesbank  from  direct  political  interference,  for example, 
has  been a central  reason  why the deutsche  mark  has consistently  been a 
stable  currency.  CBR  independence  should  provide  for a CBR  chairman 
and board of directors, appointed  for several years and free from the 
threat of early dismissal;  a CBR charter  establishing  the statutory  re- 
quirement  that  the bank  pursue  the aims of price and exchange  rate sta- 
bility; no governmental  or parliamentary  approval  of monetary  policy; 
a prohibition  on subsidized  credits;  and an end to automatic  crediting  of 
the state budget. 
We would also support  consideration  of a further  step-a  strict cur- 
rency board-as  an institutional  device to restrict  the issue of domestic 
credit. With a currency  board, the central  bank would refrain  from all 
domestic credit expansion;  changes in high-powered  money would re- 
sult solely from purchases  and sales of foreign exchange at a fixed ex- 
change rate. Typically, the central bank sets the initial exchange rate 
and  reserve  level so as to guarantee  100  percent  backing  of the domestic 
base money. In Russia, full monetary  backing should include all cur- 
rency, bank reserves, and household deposits at the Russian national 
savings  bank,  the Sberagatalny  Bank  (which,  in effect, are  claims  on the 
central  bank).  According  to the government  of Russia, as of September 
1992, this was about $8 billion at the market  exchange rate. (An even 
higher  starting  level of reserves would be advisable  in order  to support 
a post-stabilization  buildup  of money without  Russia  having  to run  large 
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however, are at most $1 billion  to $2 billion, with heavy short-term  for- 
eign  liabilities  that  in fact leave Russia, in effect, with negative  reserves. 
Thus the construction  of a currency  board  would require  large-scale  fi- 
nancial  assistance  from  the West. 
PRESIDENTIAL-PARLIAMENTARY  SYSTEM.  Further  progress  in 
achieving  political stability will require  a new constitution, delimiting 
the powers  of the executive and  legislative  branches  and stating  the pro- 
visions for  future  elections. We believe that  Russia  would  be best served 
by a mixed presidential-parliamentary  system in the French  mold, also 
known as a semipresidential  system.77  In such a system, the directly 
elected president  nominates  the prime  minister,  who must  be confirmed 
by parliament.  The president  and  the prime  minister  share  powers, with 
the prime minister typically having responsibility  for the day-to-day 
management  of the government.  The president  provides an anchor of 
stability,  as well as insurance  against  political  paralysis,  while  the parlia- 
ment and prime  minister  help to prevent  the president  from sliding  into 
personalism  or despotism.78  Russia already seems to be evolving into 
such a system, but it should  now be enshrined  in the new constitution. 
RULE  OF  LAW.  In addition  to constitutional  reform  to define presi- 
dential  and  parliamentary  powers, and  new elections for parliament  and 
local governments,  Russia must make special efforts to establish  an in- 
dependentjudiciary  and  an executive subject  to the rule  of law. The  Rus- 
sian  autocratic  tradition  was the antithesis  of the rule  of law:  Tsarist  pre- 
77. For essays on the comparative  merits of the presidential,  parliamentary,  and 
mixed-presidential  systems, see Lijphart  (1992). 
78. Jean  Blondel's  description  seems  particularly  apt  for  Russia.  Blondel  (1992,  p. 172) 
argues  that  "neither  parliamentarism  nor  constitutional  presidentialism  can  be expected  to 
bring  about  a solution  to the problems  of a country  in which efforts  are made  to set up a 
pluralist  system, but where the party  configuration  is weak or insufficiently  streamlined. 
A dual  leadership  system, on the other  hand,  may  be able to provide  a combination  of au- 
thority  and  flexibility  which can create the necessary  conditions  for a more  stable  liberal 
regime.  In a parliamentary  system, the president  needs the support  of the majority  of the 
chamber  to keep his government  in office;  this may  be difficult  to achieve  if the party  sys- 
tem is inchoate.  But, as the president  is elected for a substantial  period  by universal  suf- 
frage,  he has authority  and  can be expected  to rally  at least some of the political  waverers 
to himself  and  his government.  The party  system  may  then  become  better  organized.  The 
system  is not  foolproof,  but  it gives the executive  a breathing-space  as well as some means 
of exercising  pressure  on the chamber,  for instance  through  dissolution  and  a share  in the 
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rogatives  were virtually  without  constraint.  A telling  example involves 
corporate  economic activity: until the end of the Tsarist  regime, there 
was no practice of automatically  registering  Russian corporations,  in 
contrast  to the liberal  practice in Western Europe.79  Later, of course, 
the Tsarist  prerogatives  were exercised by the Communist  Party. Even 
today, the patrimonial  tradition,  in which the political leader assumes 
personal  responsibility  for the state, is partly  carried  over into the sys- 
tem of presidential  decrees, although  these decrees may  now be overrid- 
den by the Supreme  Soviet. 
The Role of the West80 
Russian  reforms  will evolve in part  in reaction  to events in the West. 
Just  as Stolypin's  reforms  were cheated  out of the ten years  of peace that 
their  creator  had called for, and  just as Stalin's  plan was spurred  by the 
disarray  of the West during  the Great  Depression  (and  by the rise of Hit- 
ler), so now the success of Russia's reforms will probably depend 
greatly  on the political  and  economic stability  of the leading  Western  na- 
tions. If the "Western  model"  of democratic  capitalism  continues  to de- 
liver the goods, it is hard  to believe that Russians will turn  back from 
their current  path of reforms, even if they stumble  along the road. On 
the other hand, if the West were to enter its own deep economic crisis, 
it is hard  to imagine  Russia's reforms  succeeding  at this  juncture, even 
with the most talented  domestic  leadership. 
On a more positive note, Western  financial  assistance can probably 
play an important  role in raising  the chances for successful transforma- 
tion. This is now generally  acknowledged,  after a debate on this point 
79. See the fascinating  study by Owen (1991).  In an overview of the Tsarist  regime, 
Owen  (p. xiii) states, "From  its inception  until  its collapse  in World  War  I, the Tsarist  au- 
tocracy  viewed itself as standing  above society, subject  to no restraints  by countervailing 
social or political  institutions.  It claimed  the right  to implement  major  social and  cultural 
transformations  from  above, even after  it surrendered  some of its prerogatives  to elected 
and semi-elected  representative  bodies in 1906.  Despite the economic  irrationalities  en- 
gendered  by this attitude  of autocratic  intransigence,  the regime  refused  to reform  the law 
in response  to changing  economic  conditions  in the twelve decades  from  the accession  of 
Paul  I to the fall of Nicholas  II." 
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early  in the year. On April 1, the G-7  countries  unveiled  a $24  billion  aid 
program  for 1992.  The G-7  governments  put the IMF  in the lead in coor- 
dinating  the Western  assistance. The IMF was given two main  tasks in 
Russia: to provide technical assistance; and to help mobilize interna- 
tional  financial  assistance, conditional  on the implementation  of reform 
measures. Unfortunately,  it has done poorly on each task, and has 
thereby  contributed  to the current  parlous  state of the reforms. 
The Role  of the IMF 
Even aside from the political pressures for cheap credit, we have 
stressed that the monetary  problems in Russia are perhaps the most 
complex in world  history. The problems  in moving  from  a single Soviet 
currency  to several currencies  for newly independent  states are enor- 
mously challenging.  The issues in improving  the payments  system, and 
in addressing  the problem  of interenterprise  arrears,  are urgent.  These 
problems  merit  an extraordinary  effort of international  technical assis- 
tance, with teams of highly  qualified  monetary  economists, commercial 
bankers, investment bankers, accountants, and lawyers. The IMF 
should  have mobilized  this effort, but so far has not. When  it has inter- 
vened on the issue of the ruble area, it has weighed in against  a rapid 
introduction  of new currencies  in the other  republics,  thereby  condemn- 
ing Russia to  absorb unnecessary inflationary pressures from its 
neighbors. 
Dozens of high-quality  law firms,  investment  banks, and accounting 
firms have well-staffed permanent  offices in Russia. By contrast, the 
IMF does not have a single monetary specialist permanently  on the 
ground  in Russia!  Incredibly,  the core IMF team consists of only seven 
people, based in Washington,  who visit Russia  periodically  for a couple 
of weeks. This effort is augmented  by other short, fly-in missions of 
technical  assistance. Even though  the personnel  are often of high qual- 
ity, the contacts are too superficial  to produce  the desired  results. 
The IMF  has failed  as well in mobilizing  the $24  billion  aid  package  in 
a timely and effective form. For 1992,  it appears  that the IMF will pro- 
vide only $1 billion of its own funds. Moreover, Russia will not even 
draw  upon  that  money in 1992  because the IMF has insisted  that Russia 
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now seems that most of the financial  package  will not arrive  this year, 
and  what  has come is overwhelmingly  short-term  trade  credits  (of matu- 
rities  of one to two years, at market  interest  rates),  rather  than  long-term 
balance  of payments  support,  or budgetary  support  that could have ob- 
viated  the need for inflationary  finance. 
A simple  example  will illustrate  the problem  with this approach.  Sup- 
pose that Russia  must  purchase  $100  million  of medicine  on world  mar- 
kets and that the budget  lacks the tax revenues to make the purchase. 
With  an international  loan, the transaction  is straightforward:  medicine 
is imported;  the loan must  be repaid  in the future;  and  no monetary  con- 
sequence ensues. Without  a loan, however, the government  must bor- 
row rubles  from the CBR and use the rubles  to purchase  dollars  on the 
foreign  exchange market.  The money supply  jumps, the ruble  depreci- 
ates, and prices soar. The full $24 billion  package, used appropriately, 
would have eliminated  the need for most or all the inflationary  ruble 
credits  this year  and  would  also have prevented  the inflationary  depreci- 
ation  of the exchange  rate. 
A constructive role for the IMF is still salvageable, especially be- 
cause the government's  reforms in the nonmonetary  sphere, particu- 
larly in privatization,  are going ahead with vigor and intelligence. But 
success in the monetary  sphere will require  urgent  changes in the IMF 
approach.  The IMF should remain  firm  in insisting on tight monetary 
conditions. The point is not to ease conditions, but to help prepare  the 
framework  in which the conditions  can be met. 
First, the IMF should commit  to a speed-up  of aid, conditional  on a 
reversal  of the recent  rhetoric  and  substance  of the central  bank's  mone- 
tary  policy. Second, the IMF should  immediately  mobilize  several hun- 
dred million dollars  from the G-7 to support  intensive technical assis- 
tance, first  and  foremost  in the monetary  and  banking  sectors. The vast 
majority  of personnel  will have to come from outside the IMF, but can 
work along with IMF staff. Third,  the IMF should  bring  to Moscow its 
most experienced  personnel,  to remain  there  all year. 
The Role  of World Bank and the EBRD 
The World  Bank  should  help  to mobilize  funds  for significant  restruc- 
turing  of key sectors of the economy, including  military  conversion, fi- 
nancial services,  and communications and transport. These World David Lipton and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  263 
Bank  sectoral  loans should  involve a mix of policy conditionality;  infra- 
structure  investment  (needed  to support  private  economic  activity  in the 
sector); and direct financing  (equity and debt) for private-sector  proj- 
ects. The World  Bank  funds should  be combined  with cofinancing  from 
the export credit agencies and private  investors. To support  privatiza- 
tion in these sectors, the World  Bank should maintain  a standard  that 
loans to individual  Russian enterprises  should be conditional  on those 
enterprises  either  being  private  or being  corporatized  and  on the way to 
being  privatized. 
At the same time, the EBRD should  focus its energies  on supporting 
the rapid  development  of the private  sector. So far, the EBRD has spent 
excessive efforts on carrying  out individual  business deals that could 
just as well have been carried  out by private investment banks. The 
EBRD should  instead  be working  on support  for systemic change. One 
promising  model  is the U.S. enterprise  funds  that  have been established 
for Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and Poland.  These funds, capitalized  by 
a budgetary  appropriation  and managed  by private  U.S. firms,  spur  pri- 
vate-sector  activity in the three Central  European  countries  by making 
large  numbers  of small-scale  loans and taking  direct  equity  positions in 
local, private  start-up  firms.  In addition,  the enterprise  funds  work  with 
relevant  governmental  structures  to help develop an adequate  legal en- 
vironment  for the growth  of the private  sector. The EBRD could estab- 
lish similar  operations  in Russia  and  the other  states of the  former  Soviet 
Union. 
Financial  Assistance  in the Medium Term 
The nature  of the financial  aid should  evolve over time, as the reform 
program  itself is evolving. In the first  year  of the reform,  most attention 
is necessarily  being devoted to macroeconomic  stabilization  and trade 
liberalization.  In this phase, the aid should  be directed  mainly  to general 
balance  of payments  support  (financing  of imports)  and  to currency  con- 
vertibility,  through  a stabilization  fund  and  a buildup  of central  bank  re- 
serves. In later years, as reform  efforts shift to privatization  and struc- 
tural  adjustment,  the aid should  be directed  increasingly  toward  specific 
investment  projects  and support  for the emerging  private  sector. 
It should  be well understood  that the official  assistance  will be insuf- 
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omy. The primary  resources for rebuilding  will be indigenous  savings, 
over the course of decades. But even within  the limited  domain  of for- 
eign  capital,  it will be private  inflows,  rather  than  official  assistance, that 
will have the greater  role in the long term. Private  capital,  mainly  in the 
form of foreign  direct  investment,  will bring  with it not only resources, 
but critically  needed technology, management  skills, links to Western 
markets,  and so forth. Having  noted this, however, we must  be realistic 
about  the timetable  for significant  foreign  capital  flows, which will only 
come about  on a large  scale after  a few years of successful reform  (with 
the exception of some projects  in particular  sectors, mainly  oil and  gas). 
An Institutional  Framework for  the Medium  Term: 
The Role  of the G-7 
In the first  year of reform,  Russia's  links  with the IMF and  the World 
Bank will provide the basic framework  for conditional  financial  assis- 
tance. As the reform  issues move beyond immediate  stabilization  and 
liberalization,  however, those institutions  alone will be unable  to man- 
age the range of issues that will arise between Russia and the West in 
the course of reforms.  Almost every aspect of structural  adjustment- 
whether in energy, military  conversion, international  trade, financial 
sector reform, or environmental  policies-involves  a complex linkage 
of private-sector  initiatives, public policy changes, and infrastructure 
investment  that will require  the active involvement  of Western  govern- 
ments, together  with the Russian  government.  A broader  framework  of 
cooperation  will be needed during  the process of reintegrating  Russia  in 
the world  system. The G-7  is the natural  locus of that  cooperation. 
An analogy  is helpful  here. In the case of the Central  European  coun- 
tries, the European  Community  is the natural  counterpart  in the medium 
term  for problems  of structural  reform.  The Central  European  countries 
want to join the EC, and so are designing  their  reform  policies with the 
goal of eventual membership  very much in mind. The Association 
Agreements  reached between the EC and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
and Poland in 1991 provide the broad framework  through  which the 
process of harmonization  and  eventual  EC membership  will take place. 
Russia,  like Central  Europe,  aims  to become a normal  member  of the 
world economic community.  But in the case of Russia, its size and po- 
tential  economic strength  make  it a natural  candidate  to become a lead- David Lipton and Jeffrey D.  Sachs  265 
ing  member  of the G-7  (thereby  making  it the G-8),  rather  than  a member 
of the EC. Just as the Association Agreements  with the EC will be cru- 
cial guideposts  for Central  Europe in the next few years, a structured 
relationship  between  Russia  and  the G-7  could  provide  an  overall  frame- 
work for cooperation,  leading  eventually  to Russia's normal  participa- 
tion as a member  of the eighth  member  of the group. 
The G-7 should  invite Russia to attend  G-7 ministerial  meetings  on a 
fairly regular  basis, in order  to maintain  a high-level  political and eco- 
nomic  dialogue  on the progress  of the Russian  reforms  and  Western  sup- 
port for them. Moreover, it should become standard  for the Russian 
president  to attend  part  of each summit  meeting.  As the chairmanship  of 
the G-7 rotates each year (to the country hosting that year's summit), 
the G-7  chairman  for the year should  be assigned  the overall  responsibil- 
ity for coordinating  the G-7's efforts vis-'a-vis  Russia, including  over- 
sight  over the IMF, World  Bank, and EBRD operations  in Russia. Comments 
and Discussion 
Vladimir  Mau: The draft  of this paper  was entitled  "The  Struggle  with 
Russian  Economic Reform."  I was told that this sophisticated  title was 
a mistake. Nonetheless, it is a very characteristic  mistake. It reminds 
me of an old  joke told in Russia  during  the Cold  War.  Commentators  on 
Armenian  Radio  are asked whether  World  War  III is possible. They an- 
swer, the war  itself is impossible.  But what  really  is possible is a terrible 
struggle  for peace, which will destroy  everything. 
In these remarks,  I would like to address  the social and  political  con- 
text of the so-called  struggle  for economic reform.  I want  to concentrate 
on the last part  of this report:  the social and  political  context of Russia's 
transformation  toward a market  economy. Broadly speaking, I agree 
with most of the ideas included  in this paper. However, I would like to 
add  a few points. 
A real  shift  is occurring  in the mind-set  of the common  people in Rus- 
sia. In the public mind, self-reliance  is replacing  paternalism  and stat- 
ism. At the same  time, the public  is increasingly  disregarding  events sur- 
rounding  the political struggle-or  any political events. This shift is 
evident  in opinion  polls conducted  in 1991.  Lack of confidence  in all po- 
litical parties and institutions  has increased markedly  since the begin- 
ning of this year. The issues of real concern, especially in the Russian 
provinces, are immediate  issues of daily  life, particularly  how good this 
year's harvest of potatoes and other crops will be on private plots of 
land. 
Our analysis and experience confirm  this turning  inward  and David 
Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs acknowledge it in their paper. I agree with 
them that this shift in the public mood may play an important  and posi- 
tive role during  the dramatic  and  painful  changes  that  lie ahead. 
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Let me mention  an interesting  and  typical  example  of the public's  po- 
litical  neutrality.  In the first  half  of this year, I analyzed  various  political 
manifestations  and  demonstrations  in Moscow, paying  special  attention 
to the social structure  of the participants.  It was identical,  either  at com- 
munist-oriented  meetings  or at democratic  ones. Pensioners  dominated 
both sides, making  up about 40 percent of participants.  White collar 
workers  followed, at about  25 to 30 percent. Then came students. Less 
than 10  percent  of the participants  were workers. Yet in Russia, during 
this period  of sharp  tensions, workers  are considered  to be the decisive 
force. 
I do not think  that  we should  exaggerate  this finding  and  portray  it as 
representative  of the bulk  of the population.  Various  polls in Russia  now 
display the typical contradictions  in people's thinking  about the ratio- 
nale and purposes of market-oriented  reform. For instance, according 
to a poll conducted in May-June, 1992  by the Institute  of Sociology, 
about  half  the Russian  population  views the steps the government  is tak- 
ing toward a free market economy as correct. Seventy-one percent 
agree that the government  should give people full economic freedom. 
Sixty-four  percent  believe that  private  property  rights  for land  should  be 
permitted.  Nearly  half-48  percent-agree that  the growth  of free entre- 
preneurship  and the influx  of foreign  capital  would be desirable.  At the 
same time, 70 percent  of the people support  government  price controls. 
An even  higher percentage-88  percent-say  that the government 
should  at least fix retail  price levels. Sixty-seven  percent  of respondents 
believe that  the best way to privatize  firms  is to turn  enterprises  over to 
their  workers  and  employees. Seventy-nine  percent  say that  the govern- 
ment  is obliged  to maintain  full employment.  ' 
Moreover,  polls in both Moscow and the provinces reveal the pub- 
lic's growing  agreement  with the ideas of the leaders of the August 19, 
1991  coup to overthrow  Soviet President  Mikhail  Gorbachev.  As many 
as 40 percent of those polled now support  the slogans of the coup. Re- 
spondents  do not sympathize  with the plotters;  they are not sorry that 
the coup failed. But a good portion  of the population  supports  the slo- 
gans  because they represent  stability,  definite  prospects, and  the proba- 
bility  of moderate  change. 
An important  consequence follows from my observation  about the 
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political  neutrality  of the people. The real  prospects  of economic  and  po- 
litical transformation  in Russia depend on the balance of forces in the 
top stratum  of society. This elite includes the president  and his admin- 
istration, the executive branch, influential  factions in the parliament, 
and  leaders  at the headquarters  of the main  pressure  groups.  The major- 
ity of the people will not participate  in the political  process actively and 
directly (except in Moscow and several huge industrial  centers). Most 
people will not struggle  for or against  definite  political  forces. They will 
support  the force that promises and convinces them that it will be able 
to ensure  a modicum  of order  and stability. 
What  is happening  in this top stratum  of society? The real situation 
there, and especially in the executive branch, has changed  since sum- 
mer. The "government  of the team"  created  in November has been re- 
placed by the "coalition  government."  The former had no real social 
basis and  could not obtain  widespread  support  because the first  steps of 
radical  economic reforms  (in the form  of price liberalization  in January 
1992)  adversely  affected all strata  in the society. In a democratic  state, 
such a situation  cannot be maintained  for long. The team of reformers 
had to seek political allies in and out of parliament.  They found allies 
among  the "industrialists":  managers  of state enterprises.  This new alli- 
ance helped to change the image of the government, which now has 
more  leeway and clout to make  economic policy. 
The most important  positive result of the formation  of the coalition 
government  is the split  in the ranks  of those opposed  to radical  economic 
transformation.  It is natural  that  this phase of Russian  reform  should  be 
accompanied  by the growth  of opposition  and the polarization  of social 
forces. But this is not the main threat. What is much more dangerous 
is the amalgamation  of influential  forces and pressure  groups  that have 
fundamentally  different  purposes and long-term  interests-groups that 
would never support  one another,  except as an extreme  and  last resort. 
Thus  prudent  and  delicate  political  actions  to prevent  total  opposition  to 
the reforms  are exceptionally  important. 
An anti-government  alliance emerged in the middle of the spring 
when many enterprises  and firms  were frightened  by the government's 
intention  to liberalize  fuel prices. Private  and state enterprises,  indus- 
trialists  and farmers, members  of the military  and industrial  complex, 
and  producers  of consumer  goods-all  types of economic agents  united 
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almost  all of Russia's  producers,  especially managers  of the state enter- 
prises. 
The formation  of the coalition government  undermined  the unity of 
that  opposition,  which  nonetheless  grew  rapidly  into  a powerful  political 
bloc. An attempt  on August 13-14, 1992  by the rigid  opposition  in the 
parliament  to organize anti-reform  action and change the government 
failed;  the majority  of enterprises  managers  did not support  that  action. 
That  was the coalition  government's  political  success. 
But the price of this success has been high. As I write in the fall of 
1992,  when  the inflation  rate  has  been increasing  and  ruble  exchange  rate 
has collapsed, that price seems to be extremely high. Coalitions and 
compromises  are inseparable.  The results  of these compromises  may  be 
dangerous:  inflation  and  unemployment. 
Economists  in the West  usually  consider  inflation  to be the worst  turn 
of economic  events, especially  when compared  to unemployment.  Most 
foreign  consultants  in Russia have insisted  that  growing  unemployment 
is less dangerous  for political stability  and the prospects  for market  re- 
forms than  growing  inflation.  But the situation  in Russia  is not so clear. 
By 1992,  people and  enterprises  have already  become accustomed  to liv- 
ing  with  rising  prices. This  adjustment  comes from  long  discussion  in our 
society about  the price system well before 1992,  as well as personal  ex- 
perience  since the reforms  were launched  on January  2, 1992.  Certainly, 
inflation  is a serious  problem,  but  Russians  now know how to live and  to 
work  with it. Polls reveal  that  the share  of those who are  dissatisfied  has 
been declining,  up to August 1992.  The same is true about  the share of 
people who are dissatisfied  with price liberalization.  (For instance, in 
Moscow that share  fell from  36 percent  in June  to 30 percent  in July.)2 
However, all strata  of Russian society now view unemployment  as 
the worst outcome. Yet the growth of unemployment  is inevitable if 
market  transformation  is to continue.  I think  that  the bulk  of the popula- 
tion now realizes this. Moreover, the growth  of unemployment  would 
be a sign  of real  economic  transformation-of the beginning  of structural 
changes  in Russia's  national  economy. (The  employment  statistics  up to 
September  demonstrate  only nominal  growth  of unemployment,  with  no 
real shifts in the labor market:  202,900 workers were officially  unem- 
ployed in July; 107,800  received unemployment  compensation;  about 
2. Mnenie  Service  (1992). 270  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
800,000  asked  for government  help  in finding  ajob; and  enterprises'  esti- 
mates of new job openings has stood at about 400,000 workers.3  The 
figure  on  job openings  has been decreasing  this year, but the decline has 
not been sharp.  These figures  are small  in comparison  with the Russia's 
population,  but they are increasing,  and their  growth  is expected to ac- 
celerate  in November.) 
On the one hand, unemployment  poses a psychological problem. 
People need enough  time  to get accustomed  to new realities  (as is occur- 
ring  with regard  to price liberalization).  Thus the speed of transforma- 
tion is itself a problem.  On the other hand, unemployment  is a political 
problem  because on this issue, the interests  of different  pressure  groups 
interconnect.  Some industrial  managers  seek new prospects in their  ac- 
tivities as entrepreneurs.  Some understand  that the growth of unem- 
ployment  will be triggered  by the bankruptcy  of firms  exposed to market 
forces. This will be an issue of dramatic  tension in the near  future.  And 
on this point, reformers  in the government  had to concede to the indus- 
trialists. This is why since mid-summer,  credit has expanded danger- 
ously, pushing  up inflation.  We should  not underestimate  the social dan- 
ger of this problem  or be lulled  by the formal  analysis  of statistical  data. 
For instance, the Lipton-Sachs  paper  argues  that "if the share  of work- 
ers in distribution  and finance  were to rise from 8 percent of the labor 
force to just 15  percent  of the labor  force (which  would still  befar below 
the share in typical market economies), about 9.6 million new jobs 
would be created in trade and distribution.  That would be enough to 
compensate  for an employment  decline of 44 percent  in heavy industry, 
which itself is likely to be an overestimate  of the actual  decline." 
I cannot agree with such calculations.  The numerical  assessment of 
employment  prospects  and  unemployment  is probably  correct. But this 
is not simply  a question  of retraining  and reeducating  workers,  which is 
complicated  enough. A good part of the workers  from heavy industry 
will never be involved  in commerce  or financial  sector. The mentality  of 
the people and their  basic skills can not be changed  by education.  This 
is a generational  problem. 
So Russians  now face slowly growing  unemployment  and increasing 
inflation.  Moreover,  the inflation  rate  is increasing  in the fall of the year. 
This is extremely  dangerous  because it dampens  farmers'  intentions  to 
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sell their crops, either to the public or to state procurer  organizations. 
The later  they sell their  crops, the more  revenue  they will earn.  This be- 
havior will present specific difficulties  to the government,  which must 
ensure  industrial  centers that  bread  will be available  and could provoke 
it to use so-called  "extraordinary  measures"  or (to put it simply)  to con- 
fiscate  most of the crop. 
Historical  examples are popular  now and they are used often in this 
paper.  I would  like to offer the reminder  that  the most dramatic  shifts in 
Russian  history  in the twentieth  century  were brought  about  by a paral- 
lel situation  in the villages. 
Another  issue of political struggle  and compromise  is privatization. 
This  process is occurring  with vouchers  (or  privatization  coupons).  This 
approach  has its own benefits,  but  vouchers  present  some dangerous  so- 
cial consequences. Vouchers can help accelerate the process of priva- 
tization and concentrate assets rapidly in the hands of real entrepre- 
neurs. Moreover, vouchers might have an important  psychological 
result  if they increasingly  shift  people's thinking  to issues of their  market 
behavior  and  to the problems  of the enterprises  where they work. 
Atthe  sametime,  vouchers  canincreasethediscontentofpeoplewhodo 
notfare  well  in  the  process. (Nobody  can  now  recommend  vouchers  as  the 
best  way to invest  because  no real  market  criteria  exist  .) I am  not  sure  that 
the state  firms  that  have  been transformed  intojoint  stock  companies  will 
be  glad  to obtain  vouchers.  I think  they  would  preferreal  money. 
Russia  has no investment  institutions,  trust  companies,  or other  orga- 
nizations  that could help people dispose of vouchers. Moreover, there 
is no effective system to insure  the deposits of the common  people-the 
potential  small shareholders.  In the end, the redistribution  of vouchers 
will accelerate  inflation  by injecting  more  money into the market  of con- 
sumer  goods. (That  is, the funds accumulated  for investment  by poten- 
tial  voucher-buyers  will be transformed  into earnings  of the humble  man 
who sells his vouchers.) 
These problems  can be solved and even turned  into benefits. For ex- 
ample, if the excess of consumer  demand  is channeled  to the market  of 
durables-to the advanced  branches  of industry,  which  now suffer  from 
a lack of demand  for their products-this  important  sector of the Rus- 
sian  economy could be stimulated  without  accelerating  inflation.4 
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The balance of forces in Russian society and the prospects of eco- 
nomic and political  transformation  can certainly  be compared  with the 
reforms underway  in Eastern Europe. I agree that comparisons  with 
Poland, for instance, are important  for better understanding  the eco- 
nomic  processes in Russia. But to what  extent do the features  of various 
countries differ?  The authors  acknowledge  the peculiarities  of econo- 
mies in transition.  Nonetheless, they stress that the differences  are not 
extremely  meaningful  in analyzing  the current  situation. 
However, I must  point  out that  political  and  social characteristics  dif- 
fer radically  in the various  countries.  Russia  has important  features  that 
lead  to very specific  social conditions  surrounding  the reforms.  Notably, 
while the Eastern  European  states (including  the Baltic states) are now 
moving  out of a system that was imposed  upon them by external  force, 
Russia must overcome a regime that was created from within. That is 
why no consensus exists in Russian  society about  the key issues of fur- 
ther development  of Russian  society. This lack of consensus has led to 
dramatic  and sharp social struggle,  which is evident in the parliament 
and in the streets. To put it more correctly, this process of transforma- 
tion should be considered a revolution:  one characterized  not only by 
the struggle  of different  political  parties,  but by the real struggle  among 
social forces around  issues of historical  choice. 
Finally, the Lipton-Sachs  paper, and especially its section on poli- 
tics, contains  an  interesting  historical  dimension.  The authors  stress that 
throughout  Russian  history, political  liberalization  has unleashed  con- 
siderable  initiative  and  economic development.  They cite the examples 
of the reforms  of Tsar Alexander II in the 1860s, the course of Prime 
Minister  Stolypin  from 1906  to 191  1, and the New Economic Policy of 
Lenin  in the 1920s.  All these attempts  to liberalize  economic  life in Rus- 
sia resulted  in periods  of cruel  reaction.  This topic needs a separate  anal- 
ysis. I would like to emphasize  only one point:  the three  attempts  men- 
tioned  above were launched  in a very contentious  political  environment. 
All were characterized  by a lack  of political  democracy-a  factor  that 
was one important  reason for the depth of the reforms. Alexander II 
ended  serfdom and  created the  zemstvo.  However,  these  steps 
prompted  extremely reactionary  national  policy, which destroyed key 
powers of the Russian  empire,  where political  loyalty to the regime  was 
much  more  important  than  nationality  for one's civil status. I do not like 
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not a prominent  democrat.  And the economic liberalization  of the 1920s 
occurred  under  a deteriorating  and increasingly  repressive  political  cli- 
mate  in the Soviet Union. 
Now the Russian  government  is trying  to bring  about  radical  changes 
in the political  and  economic system. The most important  feature  of this 
period is an attempt  to combine political and economic liberalization. 
This combination  presents complicated  social conditions  for the trans- 
formation,  as well as new problems  for the reforms.  Nonetheless, from 
a strategic  standpoint,  this political climate may be more favorable  to 
lasting  success. At the same  time, the processes of liberalization  and  de- 
mocratization  in the society will survive  only if they are completed  by a 
strong  executive power that exerts control  over the entire  Russian  Fed- 
eration.  I believe that  this power is not only desirable,  but inevitable.  If 
democratic  forces are unable  to ensure this power based on the demo- 
cratic procedure, it will be established  by a Russian reaction, with all 
the tragic  consequences  for the social, political,  economic, and cultural 
prospects  for the state-and  even for the rest of the world. 
Edmund S. Phelps: I yield to no one when it comes to admiration  for 
Jeffrey  Sachs and  his team  in Russia.  The talent  and  the range  of compe- 
tence are extraordinary  in a profession suffering  from long overuse of 
mathematics  as a sort of steroid. 
That said, I must add that there seems to be more cause for worry 
about  the Russian  reform  plans than  David Lipton's and  Jeffrey  Sach's 
report  reflects. 
The worry  is that  the benefit  of the reform  program  in its current  state 
could fall far below what is possible-and  what one hopes is politically 
feasible-because  the insiders  will have enough  power  to preserve  some 
of their  advantages. 
Recall the story of the creature  artificially  constructed  by Dr. Fran- 
kenstein. A brute  of a man, he was strong  in a number  of resources  and 
full of drive; yet he suffered  from a flaw in design. His creator  did not 
include an appropriate  kind of brain, so he lacked the suitable  control 
mechanisms. 
The parallel  danger  in Russia is that the government,  in its design of 
a market  economy, is drawing  up a defective system that  lacks corporate 
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nisms  for monetary  and  fiscal  control.  I will not be able  to discuss those, 
but the report  examines  them  at some length.) 
The risk is that  this mutant  system will be unable  to perform  with the 
efficiency  and the dynamism  of a normal  capitalist  market  system. The 
Lipton/Sachs  report  would have benefited  from  an evaluation  of the ex- 
tent to which the new Russian  plans  are a solution  to this problem  of en- 
terprise  control. 
On this subject, Jeffrey Sachs, I think, has for some time given the 
impression that well-functioning  markets plus competition of private 
firms-together with an end to soft budgets  through  fiscal  policy and  hy- 
perinflationary  monetary policy-would  be  sufficient. A number of 
economists agree  with that  view. 
But in the view of many of us, to achieve the potential  of a capitalist 
market  economy, instituting  a price system (by decentralizing  resource 
allocations and deregulating  enterprises)  and instituting  private enter- 
prise  (by legalizing  private  ownership  of shares  and  enacting  mass priva- 
tization)  are necessary, but  far  from  sufficient,  steps. 
The step that  is missing  in the privatization  plan  at present-the  very 
brain  of the creature-is  the creation  of appropriate  mechanisms  of en- 
terprise  control  by owners and creditors.  Control  here means that out- 
siders, the owners, or, in some contingencies,  the creditors,  can set the 
direction  of the manager,  monitor  the management,  and  change  the man- 
ager:  all to ensure  that  the enterprise  is aimed  and  equipped  to maximize 
expected profits. 
Without  mechanisms  for owner control, each enterprise  will tend to 
be misdirected  by its manager.  The allocation  of investible  funds across 
industries  will  be driven  more  by considerations  of control  than  the tech- 
nically  possible  rates  of return.  Moreover,  the cost of equity  finance  will 
tend to be inflated,  especially insofar  as funds  can go abroad. 
Somewhat  similar  safeguards  are also needed  for potential  creditors, 
giving  them  the right  to intervene  in the event of default.  Otherwise,  the 
cost of debt finance  will be forced higher  and the availability  of credit 
will be curtailed.  Where  credit  goes will be dictated  by collateral  rather 
than  the worthiness  of investments.  Moreover,  there  will  be no creditors 
in the driver's  seat to overthrow  the management  in extreme  cases, thus 
leaving it up to the shareholders,  who may have failed to be effective 
before. 
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mechanisms,  I would  mention,  in particular,  the two governance  mecha- 
nisms that receive good marks  in a paper  by Roman  Frydman,  Andrzej 
Rapaczynski, Andrei Shleifer, and myself, written for the European 
Bank  for Reconstruction  and  Development.  ' 
The first  is an old Frydman/Rapaczynski  idea: a group  of financial  in- 
termediaries  set up  to hold  large  blocks  of shares  in the large  enterprises, 
as part  of the process of mass privatization.  These intermediaries  would 
be induced  to exercise active ownership  functions, such as I mentioned 
before. 
The second mechanism  is the institution  of large  banks  in the German 
or Japanese style. These would supply credit under the usual bank- 
ruptcy  protections  and  be encouraged  to take an active role when things 
go wrong. 
These proposals  seem straightforward.  What  is the difficulty?  If cor- 
porate  governance  mechanisms  are widely seen to be beneficial  and, in- 
deed, crucial, why should we not expect the government  to institute 
some of these mechanisms  in the course of the privatization  program  or 
soon thereafter? 
I suspect that  the difficulties  lie with two vested interest  groups  of in- 
siders  in the not-yet-privatized  socialist  enterprises:  the enterprise  man- 
agers and the enterprise  employees. Both groups have been trying to 
pressure  the government  to privatize  through  a sort of buyout  of the in- 
siders. The government  would offer them a large  chunk  of the shares  in 
their  enterprises  at favorable  terms  or give them  the shares  outright. 
As far as I can see, the insiders  have been succeeding  to a consider- 
able degree. Two variants of the privatization  scheme are underway. 
Under Variant 1, shares are given away to insiders, but not in large 
enough  amounts  to control  an enterprise.  In Variant  2, which the man- 
agers  can opt for, insiders  at an  enterprise  can  buy up to 51  percent  of the 
shares at very favorable  terms. In this scenario, any outside investor, 
contemplating  an attempt  to gain  control,  probably  would  view the task 
of unseating  the manager  as a pretty  tall order. 
The Russian  plan  does not, as I understand  it, build  into the privatiza- 
tion process mechanisms  for outsider  control. Provisions  are not being 
made for financial  intermediaries  to hold large blocks of shares, ex- 
pressly  with the aim of exercising  at least a measure  of outsider  control 
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over the enterprise.  Moreover,  some hurdles  have been put  up to hinder 
outsider  control. 
As I understand  it, the government  is not caving  in entirely. It is try- 
ing to saddle Variant  2 with onerous requirements  to induce the man- 
agers, instead, to opt for Variant 1, in which shares are of smaller 
amounts  and  nonvoting.  That  seems to be a good deal  better.  How much 
better, it is hard  to say. 
So, a struggle  seems to be occurring  as to what kinds of enterprises 
are going to be created in Russia. This could be the real battleground 
where the success of the market  economy now being created is finally 
determined. 
Some of the possible positions on this question are already  clear. It 
can  be argued  that  the enterprise  control  mechanisms  can always  be cre- 
ated  later  when the government  is stronger  or has more  time. Or  it could 
be argued  that suitable mechanisms  can be left to evolve; with good 
luck, the right  sort will evolve the first  time around  and  be recognized  as 
right. 
Either  case contains  risks. A privatized  system, left to operate  before 
effective mechanisms  of outsider control of the enterprises  have been 
instituted  and left to the piloting  of self-interested  managers  (and em- 
ployees, in some cases), will not be enterprising  enough  to undertake  the 
desirable  restructuring  on a wide scale. Thus it will prove too weak to 
stand independently  of the state. Soft budgets could result, and the 
whole process could come undone.  What  would  happen  next is unclear. 
If control  mechanisms  do arrive,  they may arrive  too late to halt the 
downward  spiral  of real  wages and  capital  that  has been occurring  since 
the insiders gained control of the enterprises toward the end of the 
1980s. 
This is not a council of perfection. Like Lipton and Sachs, I believe 
that it is better  to privatize  in advance  of good governance  mechanisms 
than to wait for everything  to be in place. But in my view, it is terribly 
risky  to fail to set up, early  on, some control  mechanisms  to restrain  and 
redirect  the managers.  If these mechanisms  do not arise or they are not 
built  in, I am afraid  Frankenstein's  monster  may prove to be an applica- 
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General Discussion 
Responding  to Edmund  Phelps' comment,  Jeffrey  Sachs said that  he 
was not only sympathetic  to the idea that corporate  governance  issues 
are important,  but that he and David Lipton had introduced  the debate 
about corporate  governance in the Eastern European  context in 1990 
with  their  proposal  for investment  funds.  Their  1990  Brookings  paper  on 
privatization  was all about the corporate governance issue (BPEA, 
2:1990). 
The depth and scope of the entrepreneurial  spirit  sweeping through 
Russia drew several comments. Richard  Cooper questioned  the asser- 
tion-based  on recent  polling  data-that attitudes  toward  entrepreneur- 
ship  are  no different  in Russia  than  anywhere  else. Although  Russia  may 
face no shortage  of potential  entrepreneurs,  Cooper  cautioned  that it is 
not yet clear how the Russian people will deal with the distributional 
consequences of economic changes. As the Russian proverb says, a 
Russian  would  rather  die of hunger  than  of envy. Alan  Blinder  also won- 
dered whether  the social fabric  of Russia could cope with the strain  of 
rapid  change.  Julio  Rotemberg  added  that, while  the increased  entrepre- 
neurial  activity  in Russia  may be welcome, studies of small-scale  enter- 
prises  in lesser developed  countries  show how precarious  and  often  mar- 
ginal  these types of businesses are. 
Alan Blinder  asked how relevant  the Chinese example of incremen- 
talist transformation  would be to Russia. Jeffrey  Sachs noted large  dif- 
ferences  between  Russia  and  China.  In China,  three-fourths  of the popu- 
lation lives in rural  areas, so that rural  reforms  after 1978  liberalized  a 
huge proportion  of the economy. Rapid  growth  has taken  place outside 
the planned  sector of the economy;  meanwhile,  state-owned  planned  in- 
dustries have continued to suffer enormous financial  losses. By con- 
trast, Russia is heavily industrialized  and urbanized.  Almost all eco- 
nomic activity in Soviet Russia was state-controlled. Hence, Sachs 
argued  that the lessons of Chinese  gradualism  in industrial  reform  have 
little relevance  for Russia. 
Cooper  wondered  how well the Russian  economy could be expected 
to manage  the historic  reallocation  of resources  that was envisioned  by 
reformers.  He reported  that  retraining  in at least some sectors seems to 
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cessfully retrained  as tax collectors! But he asked whether  the surplus 
labor released from failed enterprises  could be absorbed  in the cities, 
and  particularly  wondered  how employees in specialized  one-company 
towns would find alternative  employment.  David Lipton reasoned  that 
no alternative  existed to scaling  back some of the heavy industries  and 
that the expanding  service sector could absorb the labor released by 
their  decline, as it has done in other  economies. 
Stanley Fischer questioned the paper's implication  that whatever 
happens  after  markets  are freed represents  an improvement  on the sta- 
tus quo ante. He asked what path of output  decline the authors  would 
consider  a deterioration  in economic conditions  and called for a clearer 
distinction  between the short-term  costs and long-term  benefits of the 
transition.  Rotemberg  also observed that price liberalization  in itself is 
not necessarily  a good idea;  recent  experience  in Eastern  Europe  shows 
that it invariably  results in higher  prices, inducing  a severe recession. 
Fischer added  that the paper  does not adequately  address  the question 
of the appropriate  speed of reforms.  David Lipton noted that rapid  re- 
forms  in monetary  policy were called  for because of the risk  that  contin- 
uing high inflation  could become hyperinflation,  which would cripple 
real  economic activity  in a major  way. 
Fischer took issue with the idea that central bank independence  to 
control  the money supply  was necessarily  a good thing, pointing  to the 
recent  expansion  in the Russian  money supply, which occurred  under  a 
central  bank  that  was independent  of the government.  Rather  than  trust- 
ing  in independence  per se, he suggested  that  the proper  conduct  of mon- 
etary  policy should  be framed  as a broader  and  explicit  policy  issue. Lip- 
ton noted  that  the Russian  central  bank,  under  its acting  president,  is not 
independent,  but  rather  acts under  the control  of Parliament.  The recent 
extension  of a large  volume  of industry  credits  was a parliamentary  deci- 
sion made  on political  grounds,  not the action of an independent  central 
bank.  Greater  independence  would  reduce  such  political  influences  over 
monetary  policy. 
Fischer also disagreed  with the paper's  recommendation  to establish 
a currency  board  for Russia, reasoning  that it would be too expensive 
for a country  of Russia's size to hold the necessary quantity  of hard  cur- 
rency. Robert Hall suggested encouraging  the use of U.S. currency  in 
Russia, with the seigniorage  returned  to Russia  by the Federal  Reserve. David Lipton and Jeffrey D.  Sachs  279 
Hall  also drew  attention  to the weakness  of a financial  system  that  issued 
currency  to finance  its generous  granting  of credit. He argued  that  it was 
more important  to create intermediary  institutions  that extended credit 
by attracting  domestic sources of funds, so as to avoid the current  bank- 
ing system's built-in  inflationary  bias. 
Fischer proposed a two-part strategy for providing  aid to Russia. 
First,  the West should  provide  $8 billion  to $10  billion  a year  in basic aid, 
independent  of the progress  of reforms. Second, additional  assistance 
should  be made conditional  on Russia's reaching  a standby  agreement 
with the IMF, thereby  increasing  the Fund's role in the conduct of pol- 
icy. Hall  pointed  out that  the paper  makes  only a weak case for U. S  . aid, 
portraying  it mainly  as a way to buy credibility  for U.S. advice. 
Olivier Blanchard  asked how the position of Russia would be im- 
proved if subsidies to other republics  were ended. Sachs replied that 
subsidies  in the form of credits to business and artificially  cheap oil ap- 
pear to be between 5 and 10 percent of Russian  GDP. As to why these 
high-cost  subsidies are maintained  in a time of austerity,  he said that a 
strong  lobby of Russian  producers  favors  continuing  to extend  credits  to 
other  republics  to finance  purchases  of Russian  output. 
The situation  in the oil industry  drew several  further  comments.  Wil- 
liam Nordhaus  quoted oil industry  sources who confirmed  that a large 
decline in production  has occurred and who attributed  the decline to 
poor maintenance  of equipment.  He suggested that the main concern 
should  be the loss of central  government  control over the oil industry. 
Previously,  oil export taxes contributed  $30 billion  to revenues, but oil 
tax receipts  have now fallen  to zero. Fischer  questioned  the data  for the 
energy sector, which show little decline in energy consumption,  but an 
extreme drop in exports. He argued  that oil exports were in fact high, 
but were unreported  and  constituted  a form  of capital  flight. 
Mancur  Olson argued  that the paper  gave too much emphasis  to pri- 
vatization. In most formerly communist countries, private rights to 
property  are ambiguous  and insecure, so "privatization"  does not have 
a clear meaning.  He contended, moreover,  that many  if not most of the 
large  state-owned  enterprises  do not appear  to be viable  in an open mar- 
ket economy. They are kept alive by the government  because they are 
powerful  insider  lobbies. He conjectured  that the fastest growth  could 
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enforcement rights rather than to privatization  because this would 
greatly increase investment by new enterprises  and by foreign firms. 
Sachs responded that the privatization  issue was not as clearcut as 
Olson suggested:  not all firms  need to be liquidated  after  privatization, 
and some valuable  opportunities  have already  been exploited  by privat- 
ized firms. David Lipton and Jeffrey D.  Sachs  281 
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